What was behind the KNLA’s withdrawal from Myawaddy?

On April 11, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 6 and its allies launched an attack on the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 275 camp west of Myawaddy, forcing the junta troops stationed there to retreat with their weapons. About 200 junta soldiers, including troops from LIB 275, the Coastal Military Command, and Light Infantry Division (LID) 44, retreated to a truck depot north of Myawaddy, near Friendship Bridge 2. The bridge, sometimes simply called “Border Bridge 2” by locals, is one of two connecting Myawaddy to Mae Sot, a town on the opposite bank of the Moei (Thaungyin) River in Thailand’s Tak Province. After capturing the LIB 275 camp, the KNLA raised the Karen national flag. There have been reports that the Karen State Border Guard Force (Karen BGF) assisted the retreating junta forces, who dug trenches and fortified their defences at the truck depot near Friendship Bridge 2. Some Myawaddy residents and resistance forces said they suspected the BGF was providing them with food. When the KNLA and its allied forces launched an attack on the junta troops near the bridge, the regime forces resisted. The anti-junta forces deployed drones in their attack, while the regime’s air force dropped as many as 12 bombs on either side of the bridge using MI-35 helicopters and Y-12 aircraft. It is reported that there were casualties on both sides during the battle, but it is difficult to know the exact numbers. Between seven and nine civilians were killed in the fighting, and about 3,000 refugees had to cross the Moei River to Mae Sot. As a consequence of the conflict, over 30 houses located near the bridge in Myawaddy’s Ward 5 were engulfed in flames and gutted. Throughout the fighting, the BGF ensured security in Myawaddy, refraining from attacking either side. In addition to the BGF, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KNU/KNLA PC) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) are also active in Myawaddy. A man injured by an airstrike in Myawaddy receives treatment in Mae Sot (Myanmar Now) The KNLA’s mysterious withdrawal After intense fighting throughout the day on April 20, the conflict abruptly ceased on the morning of April 21. The reason behind this sudden halt remains unclear, but it is speculated that the cessation occurred following the withdrawal of KNLA troops. It appears that not only did the KNLA and its allied forces retreat from their positions facing the junta troops near Friendship Bridge 2, but they also withdrew from the captured LIB 275 camp west of Myawaddy. Two days after the fighting ceased, on the afternoon of April 23, the junta forces stationed near the bridge reoccupied the LIB 275 camp with assistance from the Karen BGF. According to pro-regime Telegram channels, the junta army promptly removed the Karen national flag from the LIB 275 camp and reinstated the Myanmar flag. This news of the junta reclaiming its main camp in Myawaddy came as a shock to the people and resistance comrades monitoring the situation in the town. Many people took to Facebook to question why the KNLA withdrew its forces when it had been able to contain the junta troops near Friendship Bridge 2. The KNLA’s political wing, the Karen National Union (KNU), provided an explanation, stating that the retreat was executed to intercept the junta's Aung Zeya column, which was en route to Myawaddy to provide reinforcements. KNU spokesperson Padoh Saw Taw Nee said that the BGF forces facilitated the arrival of the junta forces at the LIB 275 camp and assisted them in replacing the Karen national flag with the Myanmar flag. He further explained, “Given this important situation, to avoid falling into the enemy’s trap, we deemed it necessary to temporarily withdraw our KNLA joint forces from Myawaddy.” The nature of the “trick” referred to by Padoh Saw Taw Nee is not explicitly specified, leaving it unclear what tactic the junta army might have employed. However, Padoh Saw Taw Nee said that they would totally defeat the Aung Zeya column. Additionally, he said that the KNU’s activities are not just for Myawaddy town. Padoh Saw Taw Nee’s explanation for the KNU’s withdrawal is vague and may not be accepted by the general public. This is because when the KNLA had control of the LIB 275 camp and had already successfully intercepted and halted the 500-strong Aung Zeya column with its allies near Kawtnwe, a village located east of Kawkareik. During that period, the KNLA and joint forces had taken control of LIB 275. At that juncture, it’s plausible that the KNLA had the capability to establish two battlefronts against the junta army: one confronting the junta troops near Friendship Bridge 2, and another engaging the reinforcement column near Kawkareik. This reinforcement column was intended to be dispatched towards Myawaddy as part of Operation Aung Zeya and was trying to advance through the Dawna Hills west of Myawaddy. Some resistance fighters and Karen researchers based along the Thai-Myanmar border speculated that there might be a specific reason behind the KNLA’s withdrawal. Children from Myanmar whose families fled to Mae Sot to escape the fighting in Myawaddy (Myanmar Now) What is the real reason behind KNLA’s withdrawal According to a high-ranking Thai army officer cited in a report by BBC Thai, the cessation of fighting occurred due to negotiations between the Myanmar army and the Karen armed groups. It’s worth noting that a group called the Unity Committee For Karen Armed Groups (UCKAG), comprising the KNU, Karen BGF, KNU/KNLA-PC, and DKBA, was formed before the coup in 2021. After the coup, the UCKAG made efforts to mitigate potential conflicts among the four Karen armed groups. Based on information from the BBC Thai, it’s plausible to speculate whether negotiations took place between the Karen armed groups and the junta through this committee. However, a high-ranking KNU officer told Myanmar Now that there have been no dialogues between the junta and the KNU. “In my personal opinion, our group, the KNU, simply could not stand the huge impacts of the war. There were more forces on the opposing side, so we withdrew. It’s not about negotiating with them. We retreated because we could not withstand them.” Nevertheless, the possibility of discussions between the KNU and the junta cannot be completely ruled out. For instance, the KNLA Brigade 7, operating along Asian Highway and north of Myawaddy, reportedly engaged in meetings with the junta. In March, Thailand’s humanitarian aid, provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Nabu and Tharmanya areas of the town of Paingkyon, was transported by car by BGF troops and distributed to KNLA Brigade 7 and the junta’s authorities in Karen State, according to regime sources. Additionally, some representatives of the KNLA Brigade 7 even participated in the Peace Cup soccer match organised by the junta-appointed Karen State chief minister. People from the BGF, KNU/KNLA-PC, and DKBA based in Myawaddy also participated in the football match, which was held in the state capital Hpa-an. So, regarding the KNLA, it seems that the junta follows a principle of dealing separately with each brigade. “Our troops and KNLA Brigade 6 are fighting each other. However, KNLA Brigade 7 adheres to the NCA,” said Saw Khin Maung Myint, Karen State’s minister of economic affairs, who also serves as spokesman for the state’s regime-appointed administration, referring to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. So, it is not impossible for the KNU Central to communicate with the junta through Brigade 7. However, regarding the possible negotiations between the junta and Karen armed groups including the KNU, it is challenging to prove at present, so it can only be considered a controversial matter. Khu, a Myanmar national from Myawaddy, carries her dog after crossing over into Thailand at the border checkpoint in Thailand’s Mae Sot District on April 10 (Manan Vatsyayana / AFP) The BGF, a key player in Myawaddy When discussing Myawaddy, it’s essential to consider the role of the BGF, led by Col. Saw Chit Thu. The BGF dominates the Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, situated north of Myawaddy, known for issues like online gambling, human trafficking, and torture. The BGF boasts as many as 8,000 troops. Throughout 2024, amidst the intense conflict between the junta and the KNLA in townships such as Kawkareik and Myawaddy, the BGF maintained a neutral stance. During the occupation of the junta’s tactical camp in Thin Gan Nyi Naung by KNLA Brigade 6 and its allied forces, the BGF relocated hundreds of junta soldiers and their family members to Shwe Kokko and gave them shelter. According to the BGF, when it attempted to evacuate the junta troops from Thin Gan Nyi Naung, the KNLA and its allied forces stopped their attacks. At the time, a BGF officer told Myanmar Now that the junta’s Director of BGF Affairs contacted them and threatened military action against the BGF concerning the return of those detained personnel. The BGF officer said that if the junta army attacked the BGF, they would resist. Regarding the KNLA and its allied forces, he also said that the BGF did not want any conflict in Myawaddy. However, the BGF later facilitated the junta troops’ return to the LIB 275 camp and helped them replace the Karen national flag with the Myanmar flag at the location. So, considering the statements and actions of the BGF, it appears that there is a lack of clarity. A resistance fighter based in Karen State, who preferred to remain anonymous, said that due to the BGF’s military strength and financial resources, their shifts in position hold significant influence and elevate their importance in the conflict. Even among resistance fighters based in Karen State, there is uncertainty regarding whether the BGF aligns with the junta or operates as a rebel against the junta. “I would like to say that we are monitoring their actions cautiously. We hesitate to make definitive judgments because we do not know the extent of coordination between the Karen leaders,” said the resistance fighter. Currently, LIB 275 in Myawaddy is under the control of the junta, and junta forces are still stationed at the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge 2. As of this writing, on April 25, the two friendship bridges were still closed. Some local residents said that Myanma Economic Bank has resumed operations in Myawaddy, but private banks remain closed. In the town, control over key institutions such as the police station, the frontline office, and the District General Administration Office rests with the junta. The BGF maintains its responsibility for ensuring town security. A local resident from Myawaddy said, “There is also a District General Administration Office in Myawaddy, as well as a Township General Administration Office. Ward administrators are currently active. Regarding the administrative mechanism, I perceive that there have been no changes.”

What was behind the KNLA’s withdrawal from Myawaddy?

The unexpected move reflects the complicated situation on the ground in Karen State, where doubts linger about where some groups stand in the conflict

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