Myanmar junta counteroffensive pushes Karenni resistance into new phase of war

By retaking key towns and transport routes across Karenni (Kayah) State, Myanmar’s military junta has reversed some of the most significant battlefield gains achieved by resistance forces since the 2021 coup. Yet despite the momentum shift, the conflict is far from settled. The junta’s “Yan Naing Min” counteroffensive has exposed structural weaknesses within the Karenni resistance while deepening a humanitarian crisis that now affects hundreds of thousands of civilians. Although resistance groups continue to dominate large rural areas, the military’s return to several urban centres suggests the war in eastern Myanmar is entering a prolonged and increasingly destructive phase. For many residents, the consequences are immediate. In Demoso Township, where junta troops have re-established positions along the Demoso–Hpruso road, civilians say movement has become dangerous and unpredictable. “Earlier, we could travel by car with ease, but now we have to walk through rough jungle paths, which takes hours,” one resident said, speaking anonymously for security reasons. The renewed military pressure has not only disrupted civilian life but also forced Karenni resistance forces onto the defensive after years of territorial expansion. A resistance stronghold under pressure In the years after the 2021 coup, Karenni State emerged as one of the junta’s most vulnerable fronts. Resistance groups backed by the Karenni National Progressive Party, particularly the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, rapidly seized territory across much of the state’s mountainous interior. At their peak, Karenni forces controlled or contested areas stretching from Mese on the Thai border to Loikaw, the state capital, while also establishing strong positions in Pekon and Moebye near the Shan-Karenni border. The gains became especially visible during Operation 1111, launched in November 2023, when resistance fighters captured large parts of several towns. The advances appeared to signal that the junta was steadily losing control in eastern Myanmar. Yet the Karenni resistance never achieved the decisive military superiority seen elsewhere in the country. Unlike the Arakan Army in Rakhine State or the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in northern Shan State, Karenni forces lacked the manpower and heavy weaponry needed to fully overwhelm entrenched military positions. Even during the height of Operation 1111, the junta retained critical bases in Hpruso and Bawlake and managed to hold onto its Regional Operations Command in Loikaw. Those remaining footholds would later become launching points for the military’s recovery. Junta troops after retaking control of a key road in Karenni State in December 2025 (Photo: State media) The junta’s strategic recovery The balance of power began shifting in late 2024 when the military launched Operation Yan Naing Min under the direction of the Eastern Regional Military Command based in Taunggyi. The operation marked a significant adaptation by the junta after years of battlefield losses across Myanmar. Rather than relying solely on exhausted frontline troops, the military combined conscription, allied militias, and expanded aerial warfare to rebuild its position in Karenni State. A major factor was the activation of the People’s Military Service Law in February 2024, which allowed the junta to replenish depleted forces through compulsory military service. Newly recruited conscripts were deployed to the Karenni front, providing badly needed manpower. The military also benefited from support by the Pa-O National Organisation and its armed wing, the Pa-O National Army, a pro-junta militia based in southern Shan State. The Pa-O region occupies strategically important territory between Naypyitaw and Karenni State. Since the coup, the PNO/PNA has remained aligned with the military and reportedly recruited new fighters by offering local men exemption from direct conscription into the junta army. This alliance gave the military a stronger logistical and manpower base for its counter-offensive. At the same time, the junta increased its use of heavy artillery, airstrikes, bomber drones, and kamikaze drones. Resistance fighters who had previously relied on mobility and local terrain suddenly faced a better-supplied and technologically reinforced military campaign. The results have become increasingly visible on the ground. By early 2025, the junta announced it had recaptured Hsihseng, Pekon, Moebye, Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpasawng. It also regained control over key highways linking southern Shan State with Karenni territory, including the Hsihseng-Loikaw and Moebye-Loikaw roads. Control of transport routes has become one of the military’s central objectives, allowing it to reconnect isolated garrisons and restore supply lines that resistance groups had disrupted for years. Rural areas still under resistance control Despite the junta’s territorial gains, resistance leaders argue that military control remains limited outside urban corridors. According to the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), resistance forces continue to administer Mese, Shadaw, Ywarthit, Mawchi, Nan Mei Khon, and hundreds of surrounding villages. The distinction between urban and rural control remains critical to understanding the conflict. Although the military has re-entered towns, many villages remain effectively outside state administration. Resistance officials estimate that roughly 300,000 people—including around 200,000 internally displaced persons—currently live in IEC-administered areas. That means a significant portion of the population still depends on resistance governance structures rather than junta institutions. “Since the junta army re-entered, most villages have become places where people no longer dare to live,” IEC Secretary 2 Banyar Khun Aung said. The military’s inability to establish stable civilian administration beyond strategic routes highlights the limits of its recovery. Like many other fronts in Myanmar’s civil war, Karenni State is increasingly defined by fragmented territorial control rather than outright victory by either side. Displaced people from Hpruso Township cross mountainous terrain as they flee a junta offensive (Photo: CTER Karenni) A deepening humanitarian crisis As fighting intensifies, civilians are paying the highest price. Recent junta offensives along the Hpruso–Bawlake road reportedly displaced around 1,000 villagers in a single attack. Across Karenni State, access to farmland has become increasingly restricted, reducing local rice production and driving up food prices. According to residents, a bag of locally produced rice that once cost around 90,000 kyat now sells for roughly 150,000 kyat. At the same time, communities hosting displaced people are running out of resources. “The people in the hosting areas were once able to provide food and support,” Banyar Khun Aung said. “But over time it has become increasingly difficult to share resources.” The humanitarian strain is exposing another challenge facing the Karenni resistance: governance capacity. While the IEC has attempted to administer territory and support displaced populations, it lacks sufficient resources to provide consistent food supplies, healthcare, education, and shelter across a war-torn region. The threat of fragmentation The military pressure has also exposed internal tensions within the resistance movement itself. Although Karenni armed groups formally coordinate under the Karenni Joint Chiefs of Staff, weapons distribution and logistics remain decentralised. Resistance factions continue to operate with significant autonomy, limiting their ability to sustain unified military operations. Recent clashes between resistance groups in Moebye—including one deadly incident last month—have raised concerns among local residents about fragmentation at a time of growing military pressure. For many civilians, unity among revolutionary groups is now seen as essential for survival. “Territory is being lost bit by bit,” one Demoso resident said. “Locals want the revolutionary forces to unite in a coalition and resist the junta’s offensive in a coordinated way.” The coming months may determine whether Karenni resistance forces can reorganise and adapt to the junta’s new strategy. But regardless of military outcomes, the war has already entered a harsher phase—one in which territorial shifts are measured not only in battlefield gains, but also in displacement, economic collapse, and the gradual exhaustion of civilian communities caught between both sides.

Myanmar junta counteroffensive pushes Karenni resistance into new phase of war

Anti-regime forces must adapt as they continue to come under pressure amid a deepening humanitarian crisis

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