After three years of the Spring Revolution in Myanmar, it is worth reconsidering and redefining what “victory” truly means for our long-standing struggle against military dictatorship. If we cannot achieve peace for all segments of society after winning the war, can we say it is a “victory” for the resistance? Against the traditional popular discourse of victory, I argue that the end game of the various resistance movements in Myanmar should be peace rather than military victory. And the establishment of political, social, and economic institutions that benefit all of Myanmar’s citizens should stem from a negotiated peace agreement.
Efforts towards durable peace by successive military regimes and the pre-coup “nationwide” peace process failed to achieve their goals. Instead of properly addressing the root cause of the country’s long-standing conflicts, “peace” and the peace process itself were weaponised by the Myanmar military for their political objectives. When sectarian violence occurred in Rakhine State and spread out to other parts of the country in 2012, followed by the Rohingya genocide in 2017, the peace process failed to acknowledge and address these forms of violence, demonstrating a lack of genuine commitment to peace for all members of society. The military and the National League for Democracy also downplayed or denied abuses in conflict zones in Kachin, Shan, and Karen States, eroding trust in peace across the country.
Three years after the start of the Spring Revolution, which aims to establish a federal democratic union and weaken the violent power of the Myanmar military by waging war, there is a unique opportunity to initiate a new and inclusive peace process. This process can envision a new Myanmar by transforming violent conflict into sustainable peace and working with all resistance actors with equal status.
Winning the peace
Making peace is not easy, especially in Myanmar, where “violence” has unfortunately been the currency of power since independence. Taking the Northern Ireland conflict as an example, the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement is crucial, but it took 11 agreements before it was signed and 22 more afterward to establish trust. However, a proper design process with the strong objective of ending violent conflict and achieving sustainable peace through comprehensive agreements can make effective deals and build trust among parties.
Critical discussion points
There is an urgent need to begin discussing practical transitional arrangements. While there is already one forum for such discussions—the National Unity Consultative Council, mandated by the Federal Democracy Charter to implement its road map to a post-military-rule era—it has been unable to completely fulfil its mission, in part because it is insufficiently inclusive. Other forums are therefore needed, where through a combination of public debate and open and closed-door deliberations, some agreement can be reached on what a future transitional government can hope to achieve. Performance must be prioritised over partisan politics; given the extensive destruction of three years of armed conflict across Myanmar, this transitional authority needs to be equipped to deal with pressing issues.
Next, we must explore a framework for democratic horizontal and vertical power-sharing arrangements for the future federal democratic union. As this topic is the critical root cause of civil war in Myanmar, it may require a fresh and innovative approach for effective dialogue. It is important to note that discussions without accommodating perspectives from those who were intentionally excluded in the recent failed peace process and national parliament between 2015 and 2020 decrease the possibility of building a peaceful and just society without ethnic or religious discrimination.
Importantly, Myanmar’s unofficial minority communities including ethnic minorities not recognised as taingyintha, or “national races,” and religious minorities such as Muslims and Hindus, cannot continue to be left out of these processes. However, currently, plans for unofficial minorities’ inclusion in both Myanmar society and political decision-making remain vague. Differences in approaches between the Bamar majority and other taingyintha over the form and shape of a federal democratic union can and should be brought to the table as long as values of equality and inclusivity take centre stage in the process. Let us not forget that the Spring Revolution is for all of us.
The third agenda should centre around individual and group rights. Since the coup, group identity politics have influenced the civic rights discussion, but citizenship rights should be prioritised over group rights. In Myanmar, as long as group rights, whether be it ethnicity, religion, or race, are prioritised over individual rights, the dominance of certain groups, such as Bamar supremacy at the national level, Shan supremacy in Shan State, and Rakhine supremacy in Rakhine State, can never be stopped. The minority groups will still suffer in various contexts. Certain specific measures, such as affirmative actions and cultural rights for particular groups, can be formulated.
As the current 1982 Citizenship Law and its implementation practices are regarded as one of the most racialised in the world and make millions of people stateless, we will need to imagine a new citizenship regime for inclusive political membership in Myanmar.
Despite many injustices, including war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and the Rohingya genocide, we have yet to properly deal with the past for healing and moving forward. Transitional justice for proper national reconciliation must be discussed at this time, and not relegated to an uncertain future.
Finally, security arrangements and the formation of the federal army must be addressed in the context of the proliferation of the armed forces to reintegrate former combatants and prevent future armed conflict. Reimagining peace must necessarily involve visions of reforming armed groups.
Participation and inclusion of the process
Determining who participates in the process is also crucial for legitimacy and sustainability. Necessary actors include political parties, ethnic revolutionary organisations, and civil society organisations. Different discussion topics may need different participation strategies; for example, power-sharing issues may be discussed more among political actors, while security arrangement issues need to be discussed more with armed actors. To maximise legitimacy, an inclusive approach should be adopted, allowing diverse perspectives, especially women and marginalised communities, within the negotiation framework. The participation matrix prompts careful consideration of who is included or excluded based on doctrines of global justice, practical requirements of realpolitik, and the need for societal representation. One of the multiple agendas for discussions must involve honest appraisals of the previous peace process and the role played by international actors so that flawed design processes are not repeated and local ownership is promoted.
In conclusion, as we strive to redefine victory for the Myanmar resistance movements, let’s commit to a vision prioritising peace, inclusivity, and justice for all. The road ahead will be challenging, but by embracing a holistic approach to peace, we can pave the way for a brighter, more equitable future for every citizen of Myanmar.
Aung Ko Ko is the executive director of Mosaic Myanmar, a local civil society organisation promoting diversity and inclusion. The views in this article are his own.
