The junta chief’s autocratic globetrotting and political survival

There is a hallucinatory quality to the images of Myanmar’s Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the country’s State Security and Peace Commission, visiting the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital city. Min Aung Hlaing, who has assumed the title of “acting president” of Myanmar, appeared in the photos on September 29, a day after attending the World Atomic Week Forum in Moscow hosted by the state-owned energy corporation ROSATOM. He made this visit to the Russian capital—his third this year—to catch up with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, with whom he discussed the “peaceful use of nuclear energy.” He also spoke with the prime ministers of Armenia and Ethiopia, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi, and senior officials at Roscosmos to discuss expanded cooperation in space. This spectacle of Myanmar’s self-styled head of state eyeing nuclear and aerospace tech like a cut-rate Bond villain seems absurd. He is less Blofeld than a blowhard in a bad suit. He calls Donald Trump to mind as he gives interviews to sympathetic media on his return flight, tired from the journey, looking like a shrivelled walnut with a bad dye job. Autocracy diplomacy Travel may be wearing on the junta chief after his grand tour of some of the most repressive states in the world this year: Russia, thrice; Belarus, a couple of times; Kazakhstan; Thailand; and China—more specifically an appearance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin in late August; and a stop to discuss border issues and security with Chinese officials in Kunming, Yunnan Province on his way back from Astana. Min Aung Hlaing responds to media questions from junta-run media while on a return flight to Myanmar after visiting Russia and Kazakhstan last month (Photo: GNLM) Min Aung Hlaing feels at home in these countries and among their leaders because of what they all share: a long history of autocracy. Vladimir Putin has been in power in Russia since 1999. Nursultan Nazarbayev had an iron grip on power in Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2019, and Alexander Lukashenko has been Belarus’s strongman since 1994. Min Aung Hlaing has also met with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of various summits. What is behind the junta chief’s autocracy diplomacy? And how does it serve to prop up the junta as it prepares for elections in December? The first thing to remember is that Min Aung Hlaing has always craved international exposure and attention, as shown when he published a compilation of his BBC and Channel News Asia interviews. As commander in chief of Myanmar’s armed forces during Myanmar’s decade of presumed “transition” to civilian rule, he sought out chances to meet visiting world leaders—striking a stark contrast with his more reclusive, taciturn predecessor Than Shwe, a man known for not particularly liking foreigners. The junta leader’s counterparts have also been generous with invitations, hosting him at grandiose military parades in Moscow and Beijing commemorating victory in the Second World War, as well as the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Minsk in June. A devastating March earthquake in central Myanmar did not stop him from also attending the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation the next month. Apart from arms deals and investment opportunities, one of the benefits Min Aung Hlaing undoubtedly sought from his global contacts was public support for the upcoming December elections in Myanmar. Russia’s ambassador Iskander Azizov met officials from Myanmar’s Union Election Commission last week to discuss sending election observers to the polls. Belarus offered to send observers back in March, Cambodia has pledged the same, and India is likely to follow suit. None of these countries are known for the freedom and fairness of their elections. Even India, the only democracy among them, has drifted towards authoritarianism under Modi. Increased defence spending in Myanmar has also mirrored worldwide trends. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, military expenditure rose by 9.4 per cent globally in 2024, reaching nearly US $2.72 trillion. In Myanmar, the military budget rose by 66 percent to US $5 billion, the highest increase in defence spending in Asia. This reflects the scale of the effort to fight back against multiple anti-coup resistance groups, and the scale of the regime’s war economy, including vastly expanded operations from new drone technology to the forcible conscription, training, arming, and provisioning of some 70,000 new recruits since early 2024. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko hosted Min Aung Hlaing in Minsk, Belarus in March, welcoming him with a salute of Belarus’s Guard of Honour at the Presidential Palace (Photo: GNLM) When the Myanmar military seized power in the coup of February 2021, the country may have seemed like an outlier. By any measure Myanmar under the junta should be a global pariah, but the regime’s authoritarian excesses appear to be more palatable to a world resigned to backsliding from democracy. Now, after nearly five years of violent repression against all resistance and opposition, the regime’s position looks more secure amid the rising global tide of authoritarianism, impunity, war, and atrocities. Western measures to overturn the Myanmar coup and punish the military, from financial sanctions to resolutions introduced in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly, have not worked. At the High Level Conference on the Rohingya in New York at the end of September, UN Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop said, “The initial international condemnation of the military takeover has subsided, and the Senior General has been welcomed to high level regional meetings with global and regional leaders. His visits include to the capitals of Security Council member states, and reference was made to instances of the lifting of sanctions.” Bishop’s own visit to Min Aung Hlaing in late September likely buoyed his spirits too. Amid the military’s counteroffensive to claw back lost territory on multiple fronts this year, Min Aung Hlaing can attend international summits with the confidence that his regime can endure, and that strengthening ties with criminal states and fellow autocrats will only be to his advantage. The shortcomings of sanctions The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a sub-agency of the United States (US) Treasury Department—imposed sanctions late last month against a Myanmar company and three of its executives for seeking arms deals with North Korea. A longstanding example of Myanmar’s fostering ties with autocracies, the relationship between Myanmar’s and North Korea’s militaries over the past 25 years has included transfers of ballistic missile equipment, multiple rocket launch systems, the construction of tunnels in Naypyitaw, and the provision of nuclear technology to Myanmar, as uncovered during investigations by Democratic Voice for Burma (DVB) in 2009. Then-General Thura Shwe Mann—the officer presumed in the media to be overseeing the relationship—travelled to Pyongyang in 2008 before becoming the speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw—Myanmar’s parliament—during the Thein Sein administration. Under pressure from the US, the government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party cut Myanmar’s ties with North Korea in 2017. However, the coup regime formally reinstated them in 2023, suggesting the trade relationship with the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID)—the UN-sanctioned North Korean regime’s main foreign weapons sales entity—was never completely severed. An illustration of arms trade connections between Myanmar and North Korea, released by the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets control to accompany an announcement of new sanctions against Myanmar nationals and entities in September (OFAC) Most arms trade, especially with North Korea, is murky and opaque, but the investigative organisation Justice for Myanmar (JFM) exposed the involvement of multiple individuals and companies—in Belarus, Russia, India, Israel, and elsewhere—in Myanmar’s procurement of weapons and components. The European Union sanctioned Myanmar’s Royal Shune Lei Company (formally called the Progress Technology Support Company) in December 2023, and Britain and Canada did the same the following October. The OFAC’s designation of the entity and its top executives specified that the deals were for “aerial bomb guidance kits”, implying Myanmar could use its procurements from North Korea to convert its munitions into “smart” bombs. This is a goal the Myanmar military has been pursuing successfully, judging by the marked improvement in the accuracy of junta airstrikes in the past few years. To facilitate the purchase, according to OFAC, the Shune Lei executives travelled to China to meet representatives of KOMID, which in turn has been sanctioned by the UN since 2009. While it is unclear how direct the connection is between the Shune Lei executives and the Myanmar military, there is certainly no scarcity of brokers and middlemen in the international arms trade—or Myanmar’s private sector—capable of arranging deals for specific weapons, components, or technologies. The KOMID-Shune Lei connection outlined by OFAC leaves little room to doubt that arms-related connections between Myanmar and North Korea have remained strong despite the lapse under the NLD. The important question, however, is what real impact sanctions like these can have on the flow of North Korean weapons to Myanmar, or whether they can truly inhibit the regime from continuing to murder civilians across the country. In all likelihood, not at all. Left: the junta chief meets President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan at the Presidential Palace in Almaty on September 27 (Photo: GNLM) Right: Min Aung Hlaing shakes hands with President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus in March (Photo: Press office of the President of Belarus). A changed world and narrowing diplomatic path The world has changed significantly since the 2021 coup, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the genocide in Palestine, China’s growing confidence as a regional hegemon, Donald Trump’s second presidency and the spread of autocracy around the world. Amid these changes, Min Aung Hlaing has survived while ignoring ineffectual Western pressure and abortive attempts at diplomacy by ASEAN. In the past year he has cultivated international acceptance of his illegitimate, criminal regime and support for the anti-democratic elections planned for this December and January. His increased presence on the world stage is not necessarily evidence of a well-calculated long-term plan, but of taking timely advantage of declining Western influence and aid, the UN’s failures, and the growing boldness of the dictatorships that have welcomed him. The affinity is not necessarily ideological. There is enough incentive to be found in opportunism, the possibility of bilateral trade and diversified arms procurement, and the chance to defy the West and the pieties of human rights-based idealism. There are few options for Myanmar’s embattled revolutionary forces to roll back the embrace of Min Aung Hlaing by all these gangster states. An application for an arrest warrant for the junta chief, submitted to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2024, is still pending. The ICC itself is hobbled by the May suspension of prosecutor Karim Khan following allegations of sexual misconduct. The assault on the court by the Trump administration has also dampened hope for global justice initiatives. Universal justice measures pursued by Argentina and by the Myanmar Accountability Project are still ongoing and may set important precedents. However, dictators like Min Aung Hlaing can simply avoid travel to those states that have issued arrest warrants or are parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute. China, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are not members. For that matter, neither is the United States. Min Aung Hlaing with Russian president Vladimir Putin during a meeting in Russia in March, 2025 (Photo: AFP) Myanmar’s resistance groups—particularly the National Unity Government or the recently formed Joint Coordination Body—are likely seen as too favourable to the West to make any inroads in the countries Min Aung Hlaing has visited, even if they were inclined to try. After four years without diversifying their options, the resistance has learned that Washington and London were never coming to help, and a diplomatic realignment is impossible now. While outreach to Indonesia and Malaysia has undeniably garnered sympathy, it has little effect on the desperate situation in conflict zones across Myanmar. Having simply dug in, watched the world change, and taken advantage of it, Min Aung Hlaing is now leveraging his authoritarian credentials to expand his network of dictator pals. But the most galling aspect of this war criminal’s globetrotting isn’t the legitimacy he believes he is accruing. It’s that maddening smug look on his face, enough to make any right-minded person consider the German term Backpfeifengesicht—a face asking to be hit. And of course, all his new chums have the same look of criminal contentment. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst of Myanmar’s humanitarian, human rights, and conflict issues

The junta chief’s autocratic globetrotting and political survival

Having withstood nearly five years of armed resistance from within, failed diplomacy from neighbours, and ineffectual pressure from the West, the leader of Myanmar’s military regime is increasingly courting support from some of the world’s most repressive states

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