This week, Duwa Lashi La, acting president of the National Unity Government (NUG), has urged his cabinet members to return to Myanmar and prioritise domestic resistance efforts rather than foreign policy. This move has reignited debate about where Myanmar’s opposition leadership is best placed.
It is an open secret that several NUG ministers and deputy ministers live in exile, often involuntarily. The junta has revoked the citizenship of many, effectively rendering them stateless and targets for prosecution, pushing them to leave for their own safety.
Additionally, many NUG members need to travel internationally to lobby, fundraise, and engage with the Myanmar diaspora and foreign governments. This has been much more possible to do from countries like the US, UK, France, or Australia.
Three and a half years after the formation of the NUG, many of its cabinet members remain in exile, apparently unwilling or unable to return to resistance areas inside Myanmar or to a neighbouring country.
While their extensive travels to meet with the diaspora, international organisations, and governments can be justified as necessary, the exiled lifestyle can appear as luxurious compared to the sacrifices made by the rank-and-file resistance forces and their supporters within Myanmar. To be fair, not all NUG ministers and deputy ministers are in exile. Nor are all those who are away from home enjoying life in exile, which they may not have chosen.
But should those exiled be at home? Is domestic politics more effective than exile politics? Do (self)-exiled politicians lose touch with and gradually forget the people back home? Do we have parameters and measures of performance for opposition governments and politicians, wherever they are? Some of these questions have haunted Myanmar’s opposition politics for several decades.
This is not the first time that an opposition government in Myanmar has been based largely or partially in exile. The NUG’s closest predecessor was the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which existed mostly in Thailand from 1990 to 2012 and was formed by elected members of parliament denied their seats after the 1990 election. While the NCGUB faced questions about its effectiveness, it did not encounter the same level of scrutiny as the NUG.
The two governments differ in three key ways. First, the people of Myanmar generally did not see the NCGUB as their government, nor did they pay much attention to what it said or did. Aung San Suu Kyi and the majority of her National League for Democracy comrades, among other opposition figures, were at home throughout the 1990s and 2000s capturing hearts and minds, which was enough.
The second difference is that the NCGUB relied less on material and non-material support from the Myanmar diaspora and domestic population compared to the NUG. As a result, the NUG is more susceptible to public scrutiny and pressure.
The final difference is that in the 1990s and 2000s, there was no internet or social media inside Myanmar, meaning that only the well-connected and politically informed were aware of the NCGUB. The internet has proved to be a double-edged sword for the NUG. It is very useful in promoting their cause, mobilising people and raising funds. But at the same time, what they say and do is exposed in (almost) real time and is highly visible to all concerned.
So why did Duwa Lashi La make this request, or even an order? Was it because he really wanted all his cabinet members to return home? Was he aware of the recurring question about the exile of his NUG colleagues? Did he simply want to satisfy the critics for a while? Only the acting president and his inner circle know the true intent behind this decision.
Whatever his reasons, Duwa Lashi La has issued the request-cum-order. This move comes at a time when anti-junta forces, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, as well as the NUG’s own People’s Defence Forces, are facing increasing pressure from China.
The acting president has issued the request at a time when hopes of an effective international intervention to remove the military junta through outside pressure have significantly waned. Duwa Lashi La said that too much attention had been paid to foreign policy and lobbying, implicitly expressing disappointment at the lack of effective international support for their cause and underscoring the dilemma between home and exile among his peers.
Duwa Lashi La’s clear directive has sparked renewed debates about the whereabouts of the leadership of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. The NUG and its defenders, as well as its critics, are now left with no choice but to face several consequential questions.
In practical terms, will the acting president’s NUG colleagues, junior to him in the government hierarchy, heed his call? Is this a realistic, and even ethical, request, given the significant security risks faced by those who return? However, if security is a genuine concern, how have other NUG members managed to survive within the country?
Some NUG supporters argue that the opposition government is still a work in progress. They point out that many ministers and deputy ministers are actively working within Myanmar to support the revolution’s military goals, while their colleagues (outside) focus on fundraising, lobbying, and promoting the cause internationally. While acknowledging potential weaknesses, they emphasise the importance of not letting questions of the NUG’s whereabouts derail the revolution.
There may not be clear-cut answers to these questions. NUG supporters need to know that questions and debates are all part of politics. All the more so when the brand of their politics is now one of revolution. Millions of people are suffering at home. It is natural for the NUG to face increasing questions.
But striking a balance between domestic and international engagement is crucial. The NUG should carefully consider how to achieve this without alienating supporters or inviting further criticism, as the stakes for Myanmar’s future are incredibly high.
Nyi Nyi Kyaw is the International Development Research Centre (Canada) Research Chair on Forced Displacement in Southeast Asia at the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development at Chiang Mai University in Thailand.
