Junta’s conscription plan will only hasten the end of military rule in Myanmar

Three years into its disastrous rule, Myanmar’s military junta continues to come up with ways to deepen the misery of the country’s people. The latest, announced last weekend, is a plan to replenish the diminished ranks of its armed forces by conscripting civilians into active service. This scheme, enabled by a law enacted by a previous regime more than a decade ago, is intended to save the overstretched military from collapse. It is more likely, however, that it will accelerate its already rapid decline. The reason for the move is no mystery: Myanmar’s brutal and once seemingly invincible army has suffered a long string of defeats in recent months. Since the launch of Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in late October, anti-junta forces have captured scores of military positions there and elsewhere. While a Chinese-brokered ceasefire declared a month ago has given the regime a reprieve in areas along the border with China—where the ethnic armed groups spearheading the offensive now control many key towns—the war rages on in other parts of the country. From Karenni State in the east to Rakhine State in the west, the military is losing its grip over long-held territory. All of this has taken a massive toll on both troop numbers and morale, as many in the military’s rank-and-file (and not a few of senior rank) are killed, wounded, or forced to surrender—if they haven’t already deserted or defected. And this comes amid a dramatic decline in recruitment since the coup, which has seen many young people steer clear of a military career that would once have been seen as the surest route to advancement in Myanmar. So it is little wonder that the regime would feel a need to follow the example of Russia—perhaps its closest ally these days—and start calling up an army of the unwilling.But does the junta really believe that it can expect 13 million citizens—the number it claims are eligible for the draft—to “do their duty” to the state? Even a small fraction of this figure is almost unthinkable, given the strong anti-junta sentiment in the country, especially among the young. Already, many are talking about leaving the country or joining the resistance—two options that seem infinitely preferable to putting one’s life on the line to prop up a hated and failing regime. Of course, it would be premature to write the junta’s obituary just yet. This week, it managed to recapture Kawlin, a district-level town in Sagaing Region that has been in the hands of forces loyal to the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) since last November. But it had to muster a massive force to do this, and in the end, it had to rely on relentless airstrikes and heavy artillery to get the job done after nearly two weeks of fierce fighting. And unless it plans to maintain a major military presence in the town, there will be little to prevent the NUG-led resistance forces from returning to take control again. Meanwhile, the situation in Rakhine State is looking especially desperate for Myanmar’s dictatorship. There is now a very real possibility that the Arakan Army (AA) will actually succeed in wresting control of the entire state away from the junta. It has already captured much of the north—including Mrauk-U, the ancient capital of the Arakanese kingdom that fell to the Burmese in 1785, marking the end of Arakanese independence—and is also menacing key towns farther south, including Kyaukphyu, the site of multibillion-dollar development projects with heavy foreign investment. Indeed, there is probably no more fitting image to describe the current state of the regime’s grip on power than one that emerged last week in northern Rakhine’s Kyauktaw Township, where the AA managed to sink a pair of navy vessels, and then had to rescue soldiers who came close to drowning after abandoning ship. This is not a fighting force that anyone would be proud to belong to, least of all those who would happily see it defeated once and for all. It was almost exactly a year ago that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing last broached the subject of conscription, stating at the time that it was “a must for all” to shoulder the burden of national defence. “If the country does not have defence capability, we will face a loss. If so, other countries do not pay respect to us,” he said. But it isn’t other countries that the regime has to worry about. Myanmar’s military has long since lost the respect of the country’s people, who have already paid an enormous price for the regime’s senseless insistence on defying their clearly expressed desire for a political system purged of military influence. The most likely outcome of this fiasco in the making is that it will become yet another excuse for corrupt officials to abuse the rights of citizens. Those with money will be forced to offer bribes for draft exemptions, while those without will be pressed into service as porters or human shields. We can also expect to see a surge in arbitrary arrests to feed the demand for slave prison labour. Instead of strengthening the military, conscription will be just another nail in its coffin—or bullet in its head. As one defector said last year of Min Aung Hlaing’s plan to press Myanmar’s young people into military service: “He would just be handing out free weapons to people who are angry with him.”

Junta’s conscription plan will only hasten the end of military rule in Myanmar

A transfusion of young blood will do little to save the country’s mortally wounded regime, and could precipitate its demise

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