Three years on, Myanmar’s military remains on the road to ruin

As the third anniversary of Myanmar’s February 2021 coup approaches, frustration is growing with its mastermind, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, even among those who believe his illegal seizure of power was justified. With just days to go before the military council has to declare another six-month state of emergency to extend its rule, its leader is facing unprecedented criticism for his prosecution of the war for control of the country. Earlier this month, at a rally held in the army stronghold of Pyin Oo Lwin, a prominent pro-junta monk called on Min Aung Hlaing to step down, voicing a sentiment shared by many backers of the regime appalled at the military’s recent stunning defeats in northern Shan State and elsewhere. It is debatable, however, whether this will really spell the end for Myanmar’s dictator or his efforts to “pacify” the country through brute force. According to one former high-ranking officer who spoke to Myanmar Now on condition of anonymity, such criticism is unlikely to result in a change of strategy, much less of leadership. “Like Hitler, he would rather drag the whole country into total ruin than give up power, and he’s in a position to do just that, no matter what troubles he is facing now,” said the retired officer, who is based in the regime’s administrative capital of Naypyitaw. That means that there will be no political solution to the current crisis—no release of Aung San Suu Kyi or other detained leaders, no compromise with critics, and no interim government of officials more acceptable to the public than the generals now in charge. And no moves to sideline Min Aung Hlaing himself. There are a number of reasons his position within the regime remains so unassailable, according to the officer. The main one is a lack of viable alternatives. “Military supporters have had their doubts about Min Aung Hlaing right from the start of the coup. But those doubts extend beyond him to include the entire group,” said the officer, referring to the other members of the regime. He dismissed suggestions that Vice Senior General Soe Win, the deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces and junta vice chair, might be a suitable successor if Min Aung Hlaing is forced to step down. Both men, he said, were handpicked for their current positions by former dictator Than Shwe, not because of their abilities but because of their relative youth and malleability. Neither, in other words, is particularly well-suited to the task of running the country or managing a nationwide conflict. Instead of making radical changes, he said, Min Aung Hlaing and his inner circle will simply stay the course, operating on the assumption that they will prevail in the end, as they always have in the past. “Among the members of the military council, there may be a few additions and some alterations just for show. It will follow the usual pattern. In the ministries, there may be some personnel changes, but since [Min Aung Hlaing] will remain at the top, the changes will not be meaningful,” said the officer. Indeed, the process of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic has already begun. Earlier this month, the junta supremo made a number of personnel changes to his regime, including the appointment of three new ministers to serve as his advisors in the “Office of the Chairman of the State Administration Council,” as the junta officially calls itself. But if Min Aung Hlaing believes that surrounding himself with loyalists will help him address the challenges the military is currently facing, he is delusional at best, said the officer. “He’s acting like he has no grasp of the actual situation,” he said. While his predecessors—both Than Shwe and Thein Sein, the quasi-civilian president who ruled from 2011 to 2016—took a similar approach, making sure that they had a full contingent of high-ranking deputies directly answerable to them, they were not overseeing a full-blown crisis within the military itself. Since last October, the military has not only lost control of hundreds of outposts and dozens of towns; it has also haemorrhaged troops—some falling in battle, but many more surrendering en masse or fleeing across the border into neighbouring countries. This is a military accustomed to inflicting suffering on others, not being at the receiving end of it. Morale is, by all accounts, at an all-time low. But according to another former military officer—one who graduated from the elite Defence Services Academy alongside Soe Win—Min Aung Hlaing continues to act as if the armed forces under his command were as strong as ever. He said he has heard that plans are already underway for Armed Forces Day on March 27, with ceremonies to be held in every state and region as a show of the military’s indomitable might. But none of this alters the fact that, after three years of self-inflicted civil war, Myanmar’s military is weaker now than it has ever been at any other time since it mounted its first coup in 1962. Increasingly, the current regime appears to be operating on auto-pilot, with neither of its two leading figures providing any real leadership. The loss of revenue due to its defeats on the Chinese border means that it is also running on empty. The question, then, is how much longer it can stay in the air before it finally comes crashing down, once and for all.

Three years on, Myanmar’s military remains on the road to ruin

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