Thailand’s ‘humanitarian corridor’ initiative needs a reality check

As it enters its fourth year since a failed coup attempt by its military, Myanmar remains one of the deadliest and most violent conflict zones in the world after Ukraine and Palestine. Its ongoing crisis is also among the most neglected in terms of international support. While its displaced population has reached 2.6 million, humanitarian access remains restricted, as international aid groups and UN agencies continue to rely on access from a junta that has largely lost control over the situation on the ground. Anticipating an influx of refugees due to constant fighting between Myanmar’s military and revolutionary groups, Thailand is launching a new initiative to establish corridors to scale up assistance along the Thai-Myanmar border. Meanwhile, the junta continues its indiscriminate attacks on civilians, showing its disregard for international law and making its leaders criminally liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The idea of corridors was unveiled following talks between the Thai government and the Myanmar military junta. The arrangement will initially involve cooperation between the Red Cross Societies of the two countries. The initiative was welcomed at a meeting of foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held in Luang Prabang late last month, and will now also involve the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) in monitoring the aid distribution. The intent behind the AHA Centre’s involvement is presumably an attempt to “Aseanise” the arrangement as part of the Five Point Consensus (5PC) reached among members of the regional grouping two months after the February 2021 coup. The initiative will potentially involve other countries, such as China, the U.S. and other international partners. The move has raised eyebrows among analysts and outraged Myanmar pro-democracy activists already highly critical of ASEAN’s handling of the crisis. Many have questioned its feasibility for obvious reasons: the border areas where the displaced communities are currently seeking refuge from Myanmar military atrocities are controlled by ethnic revolutionary groups. The initiative is also fundamentally flawed as it will involve the Myanmar Red Cross, which lacks the trust of the public as it operates as an auxiliary of the Myanmar military. The most troubling aspect of the initiative is that it would put displaced communities, and those supporting them, at great risk. Information collected could be shared with and exploited by the Myanmar military. While the initiative will be led by the Thai Red Cross and the Myanmar Red Cross, the nature of this arrangement will require consent not only from the Thai government, but also from the Myanmar military. This new development also highlights how little progress ASEAN has made in its implementation of the 5PC over the past three years. As other elements of the agreement, including calls for an end to violence and dialogue among all concerned parties, have suffered from deadlock or even regressed, ASEAN appears to be using the least contentious aspect of the 5PC—the provision of humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre—as part of a minimalist approach to resolving what is, at its core, a political crisis. This corridor initiative to be launched by Thailand needs a reality check. The idea is not new and has been floating around since the military coup. I have even suggested it myself in the past, but have since shelved it. It does not fit into the context of the crisis and does not properly address the humanitarian needs of Myanmar’s people for several reasons. First, humanitarian corridors rely on all warring parties’ willingness to respect the corridors as a protected space. If the intent is to distribute aid to those most affected by the conflict along the border, this would mean that arrangements would have to be made with ethnic revolutionary groups in control of these areas. However, the trust deficit among all parties would make enforcement of such arrangements incredibly difficult, as the Ukraine example has shown. It is particularly unlikely that the Myanmar military, as the major source of the conflict and main perpetrator of the crisis, would honour any agreements. Second, the international community’s political will to ensure the safety of the corridors is also necessary. This will be very difficult to achieve in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution. A follow up to the December 2022 resolution to include elements of humanitarian corridors would potentially be blocked by Russia and China. This was seen in the case of the humanitarian corridor in Syria, which initially allowed for delivery of aid with the notification rather than the consent of the Syrian regime through the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution, only to have its renewal process instrumentalised by nefarious actors with veto powers. Third, as shown in the ongoing war in Palestine, international organisations contend that under international law, humanitarian corridors, pauses and safe zones should not be required for civilians to receive life-saving support and that only a permanent ceasefire can stop the bloodshed. It is illegal in the first place to target civilians with indiscriminate attacks and deny their rights to aid. Proposing humanitarian corridors—which essentially means resorting mainly to humanitarian assistance as a band-aid, will further protract the conflict as the root cause of the violence remains unaddressed. These painful lessons should be considered to avoid any potential unintended consequences of the Thai-initiated, ASEAN-endorsed corridor initiative. While Thailand does have a valid concern to protect its border from the consequence of an escalating conflict, “militarising” humanitarian aid will do more harm than good. There is in fact a more direct, simpler, and more cost-effective alternative way to aid. It does not require heavy infrastructure or laborious political negotiations. It is called Humanitarian Resistance—a community-based approach that builds on the extensive networks of Myanmar’s local ethnic groups and grassroots frontline aid responders, and their wealth of local knowledge and experience. This approach prioritises inclusivity, diversity and solidarity, and is in line with the aspirations of Myanmar’s people for a federal democracy and inclusive society. I have had the privilege of witnessing how these border-based local groups and responders have saved and sustained hundreds of thousands of lives following the military coup. Their operation is carried out without needing the Myanmar military’s consent, to protect their own safety and the safety of the communities. They work alongside local structures and revolutionary forces, to enable them to operate along the border and deep inside the country. They have direct access to the people in need and are trusted by the people. They have shown that it is possible to meet needs without undermining rights. This alternative approach is based, however, on an important premise: those supporting these local groups must disengage the Myanmar military junta completely. This would require a major overhaul in strategy, as ASEAN would have to go back to the basics—meaning that it would have to acknowledge that Myanmar’s military will never be part of the solution to the crisis. Banking on the main perpetrator of the crisis to honour arrangements required to make humanitarian corridors work is delusional. It offers a dubious promise that whitewashes junta atrocities with total impunity, and neglects the call of the Myanmar people to end the military dictatorship once and for all. As such, the proponent and those supporting the initiative risk becoming complicit in the junta’s atrocities and the mass suffering it has inflicted on the Myanmar people. Adelina Kamal is the former executive director of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), and is now an independent analyst and strategist on international policy development

Thailand’s ‘humanitarian corridor’ initiative needs a reality check

Treating Myanmar’s military as part of the solution to a crisis that it created is nothing short of delusional

Subscribe for full access

After 100 days of ‘civilian’ rule, Myanmar remains a bastion of oppression

‘We cannot write as before’: Women poets of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

Sent to die: Myanmar’s conscripts caught between a junta’s war and a nation’s collapse

Magway emerges as key front in junta’s strategy to claw back control of western Myanmar

Subscribe for full access

Related Articles

Words that dehumanise: The language behind anti-Rohingya hatred in Myanmar

Myanmar faces deepening crisis as global oil shock bites

Few people voted in Myanmar’s junta election—and history explains why

The junta chief’s autocratic globetrotting and political survival