Divided resistance: The Chin Brotherhood’s view of its disputes with the Chin National Front

Two rival alliances of anti-junta Chin State armed groups met in Mizoram, India in the last week of February to recognise the authority of a new, unified body: the Chinland National Council. The new agreement—brokered by the chief minister of the neighbouring Indian state of Mizoram—also included provisions to draft a new constitution for Chin State. The signatories to the agreement were the Chinland Council—dominated by the decades-old ethnic armed organisation Chin National Front (CNF)—and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC). The CNF had been part of the ICNCC before withdrawing from it in 2023 and initiating the formation of the Chinland Council. After the Chinland Council convened, the armed wings of the groups represented in the ICNCC formed a new alliance independent of the CNF, dubbed the “Chin Brotherhood” (CB).For more than a year after this split, the two factions engaged in disputes over territory, jurisdiction, and strategy that sometimes culminated in violence, including clashes on the frontlines and deadly shootouts. The Chinland National Council agreement, concluded on February 26, seemed to present a new opportunity for reconciliation, promising an end to deep divisions within the resistance. However, it remains uncertain whether the establishment of the new political body will provide a lasting solution. The CNF, after all, had played a leading role in forming the ICNCC in 2021, and its decision to quit the council two years later revealed the disarray within the Chin resistance. Furthermore, the reasons for the disorganisation, disputes, and occasionally violent conflict among resistance factions are still obscure to outside observers. Why did the two sides attack one another instead of uniting against their common enemy, the Myanmar military?Concerns voiced in the media by CNF Vice-Chair Dr. Sui Khar offer one possible explanation. In a February 2025 interview, Sui Khar said the Arakan Army (AA), a powerful ethnic armed group based in Rakhine State as well as Chin State’s Paletwa Township, was trying to expand its influence in Chin State through an ongoing alliance with the CB. However, these allegations raise further questions: Why did the CB choose to ally with an outside group rather than unite with the forces under the CNF? And is the AA truly a threat to Chin autonomy? Warnings about the AA’s influence have come primarily from CNF officials, while the CB members’ views on the matter and their reasons for allying with the AA remain largely unheard. Examining internal documents and drawing from interviews with CB members brings new details into focus that support a different narrative about the resistance in Chin State. As this article will show, these records and first-hand accounts suggest the CB sought outside support for the resistance because they no longer believed the CNF would provide it. View of Tedim Township, Chin State in February 2025 (Photo: Supplied) The CNF’s reluctance to resistChin State is a known stronghold of opposition to Myanmar’s military regime. Many of the state’s residents were active in demonstrating against the Myanmar military’s coup d'état in 2021. More than 14,591 of 20,000 civil servants working in Chin State resigned in protest. The CNF—an ethnic organisation based in Thantlang and Hakha townships that had been operating since 1988—was the first ethnic armed group to sign an agreement with the publicly mandated National Unity Government (NUG) calling for the dismantling of the dictatorship and restoration of federal democracy. Due to its established history in the state, the CNF and its armed wing the Chin National Army (CNA) were well-positioned to lead the ICNCC when it first formed as an anti-junta political organisation in April 2021, two months after the coup. Considering this stance, many expected the CNF to lead the armed resistance against the Myanmar military in Chin State. In practice, however, the CNF’s engagement in the armed resistance was limited, according to members of the defence forces in Chin State or CDF—groups that formed in Myanmar to take part in the growing armed resistance against the coup. Yaw Mang, a CB spokesperson and leading member of CDF-Mindat, recalled, “The CNF is our older brother; it was the only army in Chin State. We approached and met with the CNF, asking for their help. The CNF said that it would follow the NCA.”The acronym NCA refers to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 2015 by several ethnic armed groups throughout Myanmar including the CNF. Recalling the CNF’s response to his group, Yaw Mang continued: “‘You young people, don’t revolt. Don’t act recklessly.’ And they rejected us. We asked for arms, they refused. We asked for training, they refused.” “We said, ‘Okay, you don’t need to supply arms. We will bring our own equipment and food to get training at Camp Victoria’,” Yaw Mang added, referring to the CNF’s headquarters in Thantlang Township near the India-Myanmar border. “They refused again. So, by that time, it was clear to us.” CDF-Mindat ultimately fought the Myanmar military without relying on the CNF, battling junta forces more than 200 times in 2021 alone. Although there were some 15 other anti-junta armed groups in Chin State at the time, CDF-Mindat said their number of combat engagements was more than double that of all the other groups combined. After being assigned to lead the Western Command area of Myanmar by the anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG) the CNF was entrusted with an operation involving over 300 fighters in assaults on junta bases. However, the CNF reportedly failed to follow through. PDF fighters from other parts of Chin State and Sagaing Region who had been sent to Camp Victoria for the operation returned to their respective home territories without having gone to the battlefront. The PDFs based in Sagaing Region then began looking to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), a group based in another state, for training and leadership. Morning meeting at a PDF-Zoland camp in Tedim Township in February 2025 (Photo: Supplied) Acting as sole leader According to CB members’ accounts, despite its generally limited involvement in combat operations, the CNF worked diligently to secure its position as the leading anti-junta organisation in Chin State. The group collaborated with legislators from the National League for Democracy (NLD)—the political party ousted by the military—to form the ICNCC as a transitional governing body just two months after the coup. The ICNCC represented four groups: political parties, members of parliament, civil society organisations, and the CNF. Although more than 20 anti-junta armed organisations were active in Chin State by that time, the CNF opposed the inclusion of armed organisations other than its own, the CNA. Until it withdrew from the ICNCC in April 2023, the CNF remained the only organisation with an armed wing represented in the council. In August 2021, four months after the ICNCC’s establishment, the CNF spearheaded the formation of a Joint Military Council—later called the Chinland Joint Defence Committee—to coordinate armed resistance against the junta forces. Although 18 armed groups based in and near Chin State were represented on the panel, CNF members served in key leadership positions including chair and military sector head.Members of armed groups that would later form the CB said they repeatedly approached the CNF during this time with proposals to form anti-junta alliances. However, they claim the CNF rejected the idea, saying, “There is no need for an alliance relationship; we are already Chin brethren. We are already close to each other.” Some defence groups under the Chinland Joint Defence Committee balked when, at the third meeting of the Chinland Joint Defense Committee at Camp Victoria, the CNF proposed the foundation of a new Chin State government. The other armed groups felt that the ICNCC was already serving the functions of a political body in the state. Moreover, they had come to regard the CNF as politically influential but largely absent from combat and field operations. The CNF was also positioned to leverage financial resources, including 10 million Danish krone (US $1.4 million) received from Denmark’s government in 2013. The Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO)—a civil society group affiliated with the CNF and registered in Canada—has also received substantial funding from UN agencies, other international organisations, and churches around the world. The CHRO’s executive director is a member of the CNF’s central executive committee. Whether because of these resources or other factors, the CNF’s influence allowed it to persuade public figures and tribal leaders in the state to support the formation of the CNF-dominated Chinland Council. When it formed in 2023, the Chinland Council adopted a constitution recognising the CNA as Chin State’s sole armed force and the CNF/CNA flag as the flag for all of Chin State “during the revolutionary period”. A page from the Chinland Constitution adopted by the CNF-led Chinland Council in 2023. Article 103 recognises the CNF’s flag as the flag for all of Chin State during the period of resistance against the military regime (Chinland Council/Facebook) Alliance with the Arakan ArmyThe CNF has discouraged armed organisations based outside of Chin State from supplying arms to groups within the state, a policy the CB has criticised as an attempt to control access to weapons. The CB, for example, said it was unable to conclude a deal to buy arms from the Kachin State-based KIA, when the CNF leveraged its deep-rooted relationship with the KIA to block the transaction. When the CB approached the defence minister of the NUG, the CNF intervened again, CB members said. Justifying its eventual decision to approach the AA, members of the CB have said the CNF was stopping it from acquiring arms even as its fighters were dying on the front lines. “We could not ask for help from Sagaing and Magway regions as they were even more vulnerable than we were,” Yaw Mang recalled. “At that time, which group or people were open to us? Who was willing to help us? Strangers—the AA. Don't blame us now. The CNF pushed us into this situation. They ignored and neglected their own brethren. They blocked us from getting arms, resources, and supplies.”“Not only the SAC, but the CNF also used a four-cuts strategy, cutting our resources,” he added, referring to the military regime by its self-ascribed name, the State Administration Council. “This didn’t just happen to us—all of the CDFs were blocked by the CNF. There was nowhere to buy arms, guns, and resources. We buried many martyrs due to this lack of arms.” Another CB member concurred, also emphasising that the CB’s relationship with the AA was an alliance between equals and not a form of subordination to the larger group’s agenda. “We never sell or exchange our land with the AA for arms. No secret exchange. It is just an alliance, and they help us,” he said. Yaw Mang also noted that alliances among anti-junta groups are commonplace and seldom draw accusations about compromising autonomy or only furthering the ally’s agenda. “If you blame us for forming an alliance with the AA, why don’t we blame the NUG for building an alliance with the KIA?” he said. “The NUG is also building an alliance with the KNU. Can we blame the NUG? At this time, PDFs from Sagaing and Magway are being helped and trained by the Kachin. Can we call these Sagaing and Magway people traitors?” View of Tedim Township, Chin State in February 2025 (Photo: Supplied) Expansion by the CNF CB fighters have also alleged that the CNF, while accusing the AA of trying to expand its influence in Chin State, has been pursuing its own agenda of territorial expansion. The CB launched an operation in June 2024 to expel the Myanmar military from its base in Matupi Township. While CB forces were fighting junta forces later that month, they said they came under attack by CNF-led fighters. Groups under the CNF’s command carried out eight surprise attacks and 27 drone strikes targeting the CB between June 24 and July 7, according to CB records. Testimonials from captured junta soldiers also suggest the CNF was coordinating with the junta during this period. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 172 armed clashes occurred in Chin State between February 2021 and December 2024. Of these, 13 were conflicts between resistance factions, all occurring in 2024, after the CNF established the Chinland Council in late 2023. These clashes all occurred outside of Hakha and Thantlang townships, where the CNF enjoys its strongest support from the local population. The CNF’s involvement in affairs beyond its strongholds predates the coup. Support for the CNF in the rest of Chin State has remained low in part because of a history of alleged human rights violations and extortion by the group. The CNF’s unpopularity was reflected in its poor showing in the 2020 elections, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 35 out of 39 seats in Chin State, while the CNF proxy Chin National League for Democracy was only elected to one. When the CNF opened its liaison office in Tedim Township in 2012, residents protested outside the office and submitted a petition for its closure with 70,000 signatures to the Myanmar government and the CNF itself. The office remained open. Tedim Township’s population has a different ethnic makeup from Thantlang and Hakha. The armed group enjoying the greatest popular support there is the locally based PDF-Zoland, which claims to have manpower, equipment, and a record of battlefield success comparable to the CNF’s. With another effective resistance group operating in the area, the CNF’s expansion into Tedim Township appears to indicate more interest in extending its power than defeating the military. Flags waving at a PDF-Zoland Camp in Tedim Township in February 2025 (Photo: Supplied) Kenton, a senior official of the PDF-Zoland’s political wing—the ICNCC member Zomi Federal Union (ZFU)—sent a written message to Dr. Sui Khar in January 2025 regarding CNF activity in Tedim Township. “We have received repeated reports that the CNF/Chinland Council is planning to launch a military operation in Tedim, a CB-controlled area. If this is true, it will continue to be a source of hatred and enmity that will never end throughout Chin history,” the official said in his message to the CNF vice-chair.“The CDF under the Chinland Council absolutely does not want any unnecessary bloodshed between the clans due to such acts of exploitation. If you want to launch a military operation, launch it in the CC area in Thantlang and Hakha. If necessary, we will send reinforcements,” he added. The CNF was also accused of using battlefield gains made by other groups’ fighters for its own strategic advantage. After the PDF-Zoland and allies fought with junta forces for more than six months in Taingen, some 15 miles southeast of Tedim, CNA forces intervened and claimed victory as the fighting drew to a close, PDF-Zoland members claimed. The CNF and an allied group, CDF-Siyin, now control the area, collecting tolls from passing vehicles at road checkpoints. According to PDF-Zoland, the CNF’s actions followed the same pattern in the India-Myanmar border town of Rihkawdar, where the CNA established a base after heavy fighting by PDF-Zoland had already weakened the junta forces. The CNF’s goalsPointing to the CNF’s actions since the coup, members of the CB have argued the group is more concerned with expanding and consolidating its control over Chin State than removing Myanmar’s military regime. They note that, when asked about the Chin resistance’s military objectives in the press, Sui Khar explicitly said “taking the whole of Chin State” but did not mention bringing down military rule. For its own part, the CB maintains that its immediate priority is defeating the junta before addressing internal governance issues within Chin State. The CB says it has refrained from launching attacks in CNF-controlled areas, focusing instead on fighting against the Myanmar army. As part of the new agreement to establish the new Chinland National Council, concluded on February 26, representatives from both factions resolved to abolish the ICNCC and the Chinland Council after the newly drafted Chin National Constitution is ratified. However, if the CNF prioritises its own political ambitions over fighting the junta as the CB has alleged, unity within Chin State will remain elusive, creating complications for the broader struggle against military rule in Myanmar.Shiho Kakihara is a researcher and doctoral candidate at the University of Tokyo.

Divided resistance: The Chin Brotherhood’s view of its disputes with the Chin National Front

While the Chin National Front (CNF) has portrayed the Chin Brotherhood (CB) as proxies for outside groups endangering Chin autonomy, CB fighters allege that the CNF’s weak commitment to the fight against military rule forced them to seek support elsewhere

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