Myanmar’s dictatorship never fails to take crude advantage of a high-level international visit. So it was when the military regime’s chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing met for the first time with the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, in September 2024.
The headline in the junta-controlled newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar was classic authoritarian absurdism: “Tatmadaw upholds Geneva Convention with comprehensive measures,” it read, referring to the military by the Burmese name for “armed forces.” This was another in a long series of examples of abusive regimes, especially officially recognised states, using International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a shield.
Spoljaric’s post-visit statement called for greater access to deliver humanitarian aid and stressed the ICRC’s neutrality. It also asserted that “ICRC’s determination to assist the people of Myanmar is unwavering…[W]e are engaging in a bilateral and confidential dialogue with all actors to the conflict to remind them of their obligation to respect international humanitarian law and ensure the safety of civilians and humanitarian actors.”
But just how much respect is there for international humanitarian law in Myanmar’s conflicts?
The visit, Spoljaric’s first to Myanmar, came during an auspicious year: the 75th anniversary of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was also the 32nd anniversary of Myanmar’s ratification of the conventions on August 25, 1992, under the country’s previous military dictatorship. Myanmar’s existence as a country has lasted one year longer than the Geneva Conventions if 1948, the year the country gained recognised independence from the British Empire, is taken to mark its starting point.
How have the laws of war really worked in Myanmar over seven decades of internal armed conflict? And how have they impacted the conduct of the conflict since the 2021 coup d’etat? Sad to say, they have had hardly any effect at all. The junta continued its relentless campaign of airstrikes across Myanmar even during the ICRC president’s visit, killing some 70 civilians in Rakhine State in just a few days.
However, it would be an error to respond to this failure with dejection or resignation. Instead, communities and thought leaders in Myanmar must seek a way to re-engage with the basic laws of armed conflict, recalibrating respect for humanitarian law’s capacity to reduce human suffering as the civil war continues. The widespread horrors perpetrated by the military are mirrored in the mounting reports of atrocities committed by anti-regime forces, including long-established ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), and other anti-junta fighters, including both those under the command and control of the National Unity Government (NUG) and those fighting unilaterally.
Moreover, this reengagement with humanitarian law must be driven by community voices and leaders at the local level. It will not come from hectoring voices in exile, from a formulaic normative checklist, or from an international organisations’ workshop held in a drab hotel conference room or on a Zoom call. It must take the form of dialogue on the frontline, or what could best be called “everyday IHL.”
A need for new directions in International Humanitarian Law
As extensive as war crimes have been during seven decades of war, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were predicated on inter-state armed conflict, not internal conflicts of the kind that have continued in Myanmar since independence. It is not obvious, therefore, that the full dissemination of the Geneva Conventions is what is necessary to ensure compliance with them.
The 1977 Additional Protocols, which supplement the original four conventions from 1949, were specifically drafted with the patterns of conflict in post-colonial states and wars of national liberation in mind and may therefore be a better fit for the war in Myanmar.
However, as any lawyer in the field would say, keep it simple—a point underscored in Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions. It is worth quoting in full, as it perfectly summarises the basic thrust of everyday IHL:
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
“To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.”
Conflict in Myanmar has fundamentally changed in the past four years. What had been relatively isolated conflict in the borderlands had terrible effects on rural communities but rarely penetrated the built-up cities. Now, the war has spread throughout half the country and impacted many more civilians’ lives.
Observers of the civil war have accomplished a great deal by documenting human rights violations, arson attacks, airstrikes, and the numbers of displaced, killed, and injured civilians and combatants. However, there has been less attention or energy invested in promoting basic laws of war or advocating for the restraint needed to minimise harm to civilians. Engaging the junta on these issues is pointless.
The real focus for promoting IHL should be on anti-junta forces and the role of civilians in ensuring adherence to IHL as broadly as possible. There has already been important work on localisation of legal norms in Myanmar, including Helen Maria Kyed’s excellent edited volume from 2020, Everyday Justice in Myanmar.
The ICRC’s 2024 report on International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, is also a potential starting point for a re-engagement with IHL in Myanmar. It outlines key developments that have impacted armed conflicts around the world, including the urbanisation of armed conflict, protection of medical facilities, food security, and protection of the natural environment.
The report also outlines new challenges less germane to Myanmar’s conflicts, such as autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and weapons in outer space. However, more open discussion regarding the changing nature of war in Myanmar could facilitate new approaches to observing the laws of armed conflict and the treatment of civilians and other protected persons such as prisoners of war.
The West’s military, financial, and diplomatic support for the devastation of the Gaza Strip and use of force against Palestinians across the Occupied Territories—in addition to unchecked wars in many parts of Africa, Syria and around the world—make it hard to promote the importance of IHL in Myanmar despite the visibility of atrocities and war crimes committed by the regime. However, “everyday IHL” compliance in Myanmar should be predicated on grounded discussions between civilians and combatants, and rather than depend on discussions of truth and reconciliation processes or future accountability measures. It must be a cultural shift not just in behaviour on the battlefield, but in dialogue between the armed resistance and the society it claims to be fighting for.
“The people must reform us”: Violence against civilians
Teaching about IHL—to military forces and government officials as well as in universities—is essential to making compliance possible. In a conflict like Myanmar, this teaching rarely radiates to the conflict on the ground. In long-standing war zones, such as in Karen (Kayin) and Kachin states, the senior leaders of the EAOs are cognisant of the laws of war and compliance and to some extent incorporate rules of engagement into training, if only in a rudimentary way.
The NUG Ministry of Defense (MOD) moved early to establish a Code of Conduct for PDFs under its command, with assistance from international organisations. What is unclear is how widely the materials setting forth these expectations have been disseminated.
The NUG’s Defence Policy is mostly up to international standards, resolving that it “shall comply and respect provisions laid down in the Geneva Conventions during wartime.” But it also contains the worrying caveat that it “shall comply with the Law of War and other components of International Law which do not contradict with the national interest” (emphasis added).
The NUG’s defence ministry has been widely criticised for various performance deficits, but in many areas it has rationalised its command-and-control modalities and firmed up relations with EAOs. This central command and control of the NUG over its forces is strengthening in some areas, but weakening in others as many PDFs announce their withdrawal from NUG central command.
However, the power of the laws of war is also evident in the widespread revulsion of people to egregious crimes perpetrated by all parties to a conflict. A number of excesses by PDFs and Local Defence Forces (LDFs)—whether under MOD control or freelance formations—illustrate the urgency to localise discussions of the laws of war. The Myanmar scholar Htet Hlaing Win has referred to the growing violence by members of the Pa Thone Lone—the three offices of NUG administration—as “gamekeepers turning into poachers.”
There are undoubtedly positive developments too. The Karenni (Kayah) Interim Executive Council (IEC) has prioritised the rule of law and treatment of prisoners of war by Karenni armed groups and is more receptive than many armed groups to observing IHL. Some of the new generation of revolutionaries also propound respect for civilians and the ideals of civilian control over armed actors as paramount. In a recent interview with Myanmar Now, Htoo Lay, the leader of Daung Sit Aung Local People’s Defence Force, one of several smaller groups operating in Magway Region, said “Revolutionaries must reform each other. And the people must reform us. If groups or comrades act against the people’s interests, we must guide them better. Even if it’s not by disciplining them, we must guide them.”
That should be the guiding principle of everyday IHL: the people must reform us.
Humanitarian law from the ground up
As vitally important as they are, the extensive instruments for international human rights—from the evidence collection of the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar (IIMM) to reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the work of Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews—seem a long way from Anya, Maungdaw, and Hpapun.
Similarly, it is indisputably crucial for the NUG’s Human Rights Minister Aung Myo Min to visit New York or Geneva for international meetings. But its remoteness from events in Myanmar causes difficulties for the measurement of real progress on protecting people in the midst of the conflict. What can be done to ameliorate excesses by armed groups and promote compliance with the basic principles of IHL?
Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) awareness could prove an important avenue for grounded IHL dissemination. The 2024 report of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) announced a grim milestone: the highest number of deaths and injuries by landmines since monitoring began in 1999.
Almost all parties to the conflict, of which there must be several hundred of various sizes, are likely using landmines or improvised explosive devices. These are sometimes captured from Myanmar military stores but are sometimes craft munitions, which can be more difficult to detect. The common problem of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) is likely to impact the next two generations at minimum in Myanmar.
This also underscores the challenges Myanmar society will face now and in future to ensure full access for disabled people, in addition to the enormous physical and psychological cost of the conflicts. People affected by violent conflict can often be important educators for observing restraint in war, and can work to overcome serious discrimination that disabled people often face in Myanmar society.
Also crucial are the role of educators in the rules of and the inclusion of women in Myanmar’s conflicts—in multiple roles but also specifically in relation to IHL compliance. Incorporating the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into a bottom-up reengagement with IHL is an important challenge. But multiple obstacles stand in the way, not limited to the monopolisation of key resistance leadership positions by men. Past experiences are not encouraging. A 2024 report on WPS in the 2010-2020 peace process by Khin Khin Mra and Cate Buchanan outlined multiple deficits: “too much focus on ‘fixing’ women; superficial approaches; duplication, ‘pile-on’, and poor coordination; poor quality funding.”
Many of these pathologies of unbalanced gender inclusion are being replicated in post-coup dynamics. Women across Myanmar play critical roles as local peace builders and conflict mediators, but are deplorably ill-represented in EAOs and political mechanisms. More advocacy with the leadership of many armed groups must be pursued to ensure women play more prominent roles in IHL education, compliance, and the pursuit of local justice initiatives.
This should be replicated for youth movements and voices as well. The Spring Revolution, in all its many forms, is ideally a younger generation movement. But too often the leadership of many armed groups, especially EAOs, are battle-hardened old men or corrupt, cynical, and sclerotic dinosaurs with a leery view of the laws of war. Some of that reluctance may stem from guilt for past and ongoing violations: a clear conscience is usually the sign of a bad memory. Many younger activists, fighters, educators, and health workers, are justifiably frustrated with older leaders concealing human rights violations or selectively observing the laws of armed conflict. Younger people should be encouraged to speak out and challenge leaders, be more publicly critical of the leaden compliance of humanitarian law by the NUG and EAOs, and encouraged by Myanmar intellectuals and commentators to be more prominent.
In the past several years, the ICRC has also pursued an exploration in crossovers of IHL and Buddhism, which has important salience for Myanmar. This is especially clear in everyday discussions between combatant and civilians over restraint, whether it be the conduct of operations, use of civilians as human shields, or the targeting of suspected dalan (informers).
This is not to suggest that the Sangha (clergy) and nuns take a lead role in moderating behavior, beyond what some already perform, in humanitarian work especially. Some monks have also sided with junta forces through long-standing ultranationalist or Ma Ba Tha networks and sometimes bolster pro-junta militias.
A recent report from the Blue Shirt Initiative on Sangha perceptions of the current conflicts observed that a great majority of Buddhist religious leaders had no confidence in the Myanmar junta or military, somewhat greater confidence in the NUG, PDFs and LDFs, and only 37 percent confidence in EAOs.
This suggests the lay community should be encouraged to seek convergences between faith and humanitarian rules. As Andrew Bartles-Smith, the ICRC lead in this project has written: “While wars of aggression are generally anathema to Buddhism, it concedes for the most part that defensive wars might sometimes be necessary to prevent greater suffering, and the best that Buddhists can hope for is to limit its horrors.” (A Burmese language version can be found here).
And lastly, the media will continue to play a crucial role. The ICRC Challenges report notes that “(a) starting point for creating a culture of compliance with IHL is ensuring that it is disseminated throughout society, using formal and informal channels…(t)o educate the public informally, journalists and media professionals should be given support for reporting on IHL-related issues accurately.” The Myanmar independent media is facing severe budgetary declines as Western foreign aid is reduced. Donors dedicated to peacebuilding must realise the crucial role the media performs in informing the public, and can often serve to bolster local demands for IHL compliance when reporting on grave breaches.
As Myanmar’s struggle against dictatorship and daily war crimes drags on, the urgency to demand greater respect for the notion of restraint in war and protection of the vulnerable should be redoubled where it truly matters, at the level of people’s interaction with combatants. Make the principles of Common Article 3 a daily reality.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst focused on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar.
