‘To light the way for others, we must be willing to risk getting burned’: resistance leader

When reports emerged that the powerful armed organisation Arakan Army (AA) and its allies had begun to attack the town of Ann, Rakhine State, the site of the Myanmar military’s Western Regional Military Command (RMC), one of the named allies was the relatively new group Student Armed Force (SAF).The group, which received its combat training from the AA, has grown from a tiny, 22-member student group to a force of thousands, and is now preparing for deployment against the military in the “Dry Zone” of central and upper Myanmar. In an interview with Myanmar Now, the SAF’s commander-in-chief Min Latt Okkar recounted his and his fighters’ experiences of fighting for Rakhine State towns, combat on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River, ongoing strategic challenges in the dry zone—especially Sagaing and Magway Regions—and the group’s long-term aims. Myanmar Now: The SAF is fighting alongside the Arakan Army (AA) to capture towns in Rakhine State. How many battles has your group been involved in to seize these towns? MLO: The focus in the Arakan region is on Ann Township, where the Western Regional Command is located and the battle for the town of Ann took place. The area is home to major security and defence bases protecting the Western Command, with strategic hilltop bases housing between 500 and 700 troops. Among those, the Taw Hein hill base is the most notorious. Our first battle experience came at Taw Hein hill, where we initially fought alongside AA forces to gain experience. We weren’t assigned to a specific region but were embedded in their battalions. From the Taw Hein hill base to the Mae hill base and then the Western Regional Command, we gradually progressed through basic operations. The essential skills we learned included organising troops, assembling firearms and weapons, managing rations, and handling administrative matters. Our forces had different roles, including administration, supply, operations, interception, and clearing. We progressed step by step through each stage. By the time the battle for Ann started and the attacks on the Western Command were underway, our troops had gained experience in various combat positions. Our forces were also among those who led the offensives. We gained most of our combat experience in Ann. While we did gain some experience in other parts of the area, it wasn’t as extensive. In addition to Ann Township, there are smaller centres of population within the township, such as Tat Taung and Kan Htaunt Gyi. If we consider all these areas together, it can be seen as a battle to fully capture the towns. Since Ann was the only major town, we were more heavily involved in the battle there. In other areas, we mainly served as artillery support or helped with supply and administrative tasks. The Arakan Army (AA) took on the responsibility of sourcing weapons and rations and supported us with opportunities to gain combat experience. During operations, they helped with everything, including offering guidance and oversight. Around 50 of our comrades were killed or wounded during the battle. That figure includes both fatalities and serious injuries. Some comrades, though they survived, suffered devastating injuries like losing limbs or their eyesight. SAF members and allies following the capture of the Yae Lar Lay junta base camp in Pakokku Township, Magway Region in December 2024 (Photo: SAF) MN: The Arakan Army has seized several key towns in Rakhine State and gained control over many areas. They are now attempting to cross the Rakhine Hills (also known as the Arakan Yoma) to reach the plains, with the SAF playing a part in this effort. What role is the SAF playing in the battles on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River? MLO: Yes, the current operation is focused on advancing into the plains. When we refer to the plains, we’re talking about three regions bordering the Arakan region, which serve as key routes for offensive operations. The first is the Ann-Padan road in Magway Region, which leads to Minbu district. The second is the Pyay-Taungup road, a strategic route that connects to Bago Region, specifically Oakshippin Town in Pyay District. The third is the Gwa-Ngathaingchaung road, which leads to Hinthada district in the Ayeyarwady Region. Of these three areas, our main involvement has been in two: the Pyay-Taungup road and the route leading to Magway. Our focus has been on areas where the military’s armaments factories are located. In Magway, our main operations took place near these factories, which were a key target during the offensives. We worked closely with others to carry out the operations in these areas. MN: Several DI [Directorate of Defence Industries, also known as Ka Pa Sa] factories are situated in Magway and Bago Regions along the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River. How close are you to launching an attack to seize these factories? What is the political and military significance of capturing them for the allied resistance forces? MLO: When we chose our key locations for military operations three years ago, we focused on the DI manufacturing locations as a strategic objective. The DI factories, located along the edge of the Ayeyarwady River, are crucial to the western front. Since 2022, we’ve established these locations on the west bank of the river as the foundation for our operations. The reason for selecting these sites early on was that, while the enemy's morale has significantly weakened, they still possess strong combat power, particularly in artillery and air forces. Their strength relies on their weapons and firepower, which they use to try to maintain control over the battlefield. If our resistance forces could capture, control, or destroy the DI factories, it would effectively end the army. These factories are the lifeblood of their military operations, producing ammunition, aircraft bombs, artillery shells, and explosives. The factories are interconnected; each produces a specific weapons component, and if one is destroyed, the parts made by the others become useless. If we could take control of or destroy the DI factories on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River, it would cripple the junta army’s ability to continue its operations. Eradicating these factories is the quickest way to bring down the enemy’s military power. The SAF’s commander-in-chief Min Latt Okkar MN: How close are the ongoing battles in the Rakhine Hills, Magway, and Bago Regions to the DI factories? Which specific DI factory region is the primary target for the resistance forces? MLO: The battles along the Ann-Padan road are very close to the DI 14 factory, located just 10 km away, which is primarily responsible for manufacturing explosives. There are also three DI factories—DI 2, 8, and 10—between upper Minhla and Minbu, which also store aviation fuel. These factories produce artillery and aircraft bombs and are about 20 to 30 miles from our current position on the Ann-Padan road. While our offensives are not aimed at a specific location, these three DI factories are the nearest targets. There are five DI factories located along the Pyay-Taungup road—DI 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12—followed by the towns of Thayet, Mindon, and Kamma. These factories are of great importance. Our forces are currently stationed at the Moe Hti hill base, which we’ve already captured, and it’s just about 20 miles from the Pyay-Taungup road. While there are some camps in between, once we reach Oakshitpin town, we’ll be close to these DI factories. In short, these DI factories are now within a 20-mile range of our ongoing offensives. DI 14 is the nearest target, situated just four miles from our current offensive position. Next, DI 5, 6, 7, and 8 are the second nearest, while DI 12 is the next nearest. MN: The Pathein-Monywa road connects all the locations you mentioned, making it a key strategic route along the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River, linking Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway regions. How much control do the SAF and allied forces currently have over this vital road? MLO: The Pathein-Monywa road is long and our resistance forces are positioned along its route. Since we’re not currently launching full-scale offensives, we don’t yet have complete control over the road. However, our forces can carry out military operations at any time along the route. Furthermore, the enemy will approach our positions and we just want to say, “welcome, come here and try.” They will do what they need to do, and we won’t go into details about how we’ll respond. They can say whatever they want about us, but we won’t engage with them. The main point is, if they want to know how hard we’re working, they can come and see for themselves. MN: What challenges does the SAF face in the Dry Zone, one of your military regions? Given the presence of various resistance groups, including the People’s Defence Forces [commanded by the publicly mandated National Unity Government (NUG)], how do you manage negotiations and cooperation? MLO: We coordinate with the [NUG] Ministry of Defence by informing them in advance whenever military operations are planned in any region. We also notify the battalions and units in those areas, advising them to liaise with us before taking any action, and maintain communication with the defence minister and the ministry secretary. There is substantial cooperation between us and other battalions and units. Together with the defence ministry’s battalions, we have conducted operations in both the upper and central regions and worked on various tasks. In general, there is no significant friction between us and the “Three Pas” [Editor’s note: this refers to the three official apparatuses operating under the NUG: the People’s Administrative Organisations (PAO), People’s Security Organisations (PSO), and People’s Defence Organisations (PDO)]. However, in certain areas, conflicts have arisen between the Three Pa system and the people due to disagreements or mistakes in their approach. When the people raise concerns, we relay their messages to the leaders of the Three Pas. We act as mediators, facilitating discussions between them and the people, whether at the township, district, or even the union level, if needed. However, when we do this, the members of the PDO on the ground sometimes have a negative view of us. When they do, we try to engage in dialogue with them to move forward, as we are allies. While occasional misunderstandings may occur, we resolve them through negotiation. Map depicting location of the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries (DI) factories. Points shown in blue are factories east of the Ayeyarwady River and points shown in red are to its west. MN: Most of the SAF members were students who started out by participating in nonviolent protests after the coup. How has your perspective shifted from those days of peaceful protest to now, when you’ve taken up arms and are actively involved in battles to take over towns? MLO: The soldiers who fired on the protesters are now among those we’ve captured, including troops from Brigade 99, 66, and 77 that were stationed in places like Yangon and Mandalay. They are now our prisoners of war. I don’t see this as revenge, but as karma. I feel a sense of satisfaction because we can now better protect the people. We’ve broken free from the enemy’s oppression. During interrogations, they admitted to shooting at us before, and now, they recognise that we’re capable of retaliating. But again, I don’t view it as retaliation. From a Buddhist perspective, this is karma. I truly feel the effects of karma, coming full circle. With each camp we capture, it becomes clearer that justice and righteousness ultimately prevail. MN: The Brotherhood Alliance [Editor’s note: a tripartite alliance of three anti-junta ethnic armed groups including the Arakan Army] has faced considerable pressure from China [to suspend hostilities against the Myanmar military regime]. Since the SAF is an ally of the Arakan Army, has this pressure had any impact on the SAF? MLO: Currently, the revolution has taken two main forms. The first is the Spring Revolution, which arose after the coup, driven by democratic forces. The second is the national revolution, led by ethnic armed groups, which has been ongoing since the country’s independence. After the 2021 military coup, these two revolutions have been striving to unite as one, and the situation has now progressed to a point where they are closely aligned, working together in solidarity. In this context, whether China, neighbouring countries, or global powers put pressure on our Spring Revolution forces or the ethnic armed groups, any pressure on one will inevitably affect us all. Our revolution is like two rivers merging into one. The national revolution and the democratic revolution have come together, and any hindrance to this flow will affect us, either directly or indirectly, to some extent. The pressures we face affect the physical aspects of the revolution, particularly in terms of the availability of weapons and equipment, such as drones. For the national and democratic revolutions to merge and flow together like one united river toward the shared goal, the formation of a new country and the achievement of our common political objectives are essential. However, when neighbouring countries exert pressure on us, dictating which groups we can or cannot collaborate with, it has a serious impact on our collective efforts. Our revolution cannot succeed without cooperation—no single group or organization can accomplish this alone. Every group is interdependent. As a result, both politically and militarily, there are significant consequences, including those related to arms and ammunition. The impact—both direct and political—is substantial. SAF members during a military training session in August 2024 (Photo: SAF) MN: The SAF is made up of many young students, and you, Min Latt Okkar, are also a young man. Being away from your family, hometown, and village during this time must be challenging. How are you managing these feelings as a young person? What advice would you offer to other resistance fighters in similar situations? MLO: Many of us youth are living away from our homes and families. Personally, I miss my hometown, my past, the life I once knew. But I want to remind my comrades that we are striving to bring light into the lives of others. To light the way for others, we must be willing to risk getting burned ourselves. Only by sacrificing our own comfort can we truly bring hope to the people. We set aside our homesickness by focusing on our duty, keeping in mind that our mission comes before personal desires. Every day, we remind ourselves that this sacrifice is necessary. I urge my comrades to do the same, and together, we will make this a generation that lights the path ahead.

‘To light the way for others, we must be willing to risk getting burned’: resistance leader

In the four years since Myanmar’s military coup, the armed resistance group SAF has grown from a membership of 22 students to thousands of fighters carrying out military operations in three regions

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