Myanmar resistance’s restriction of Starlink access draws backlash from civilians

For the armed resistance against the Myanmar military regime, the ability to connect to Starlink internet from remote forests and mountains has become indispensable for communications and logistics. However, the same resistance—more particularly the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) commanded by the publicly mandated National Unity Government (NUG)—has restricted the broader public’s access to Starlink, citing security concerns. Quarrels and physical altercations reportedly broke out on October 11 of this year in a PDF-controlled village in Singu Township, Mandalay Region when resistance forces came to dismantle Starlink equipment and were confronted by the locals who had installed it. The Singu Township Emergency Administration Committee (EAC)—a body established jointly by the armed PDF and anti-junta civilian officials—later announced they would take appropriate action against anyone found to have installed the equipment in breach of regulations, as well as against resistance members who violated standards of conduct and discipline while enforcing the regulations. Civilians have called access to Starlink a “lifeline” in the absence of alternative means to communicate. Their reliance on the service, and the resistance fighters’ security-based restrictions on its use, has led to a tug-of-war between armed and civilian opponents of the Myanmar military’s rule. People using Starlink internet in an area controlled by resistance forces (Photo - AFP) Concerns about information leaks and junta airstrike risks Cutting off vital means of communication has been a key part of the military’s strategy since before it came to power in the military coup of 2021. After the coup, the newly installed regime blocked avenues of communication among protesters and continued to target them when the resistance took up arms. The resistance responded by procuring the Starlink satellite internet equipment from abroad—produced by US-based billionaire Elon Musk’s SpaceX company—which was easily portable and enabled connections in even the remotest areas where resistance forces operated. However, the use of the Starlink equipment raised two concerns. First, the possibility that the military could locate resistance forces’ positions by detecting areas of concentrated internet usage. Second, that the availability of internet connections would help pro-junta informants communicate with the regime. The resistance-controlled Singu Township serves as a high-traffic, physical pathway between the Mandalay Region and northern Shan State fronts in Myanmar’s civil war. Unrestricted internet usage in the township has enabled information leaks and almost certainly allowed for the junta to conduct more precise airstrikes, Singu Township EAC secretary Comrade Pablo told Myanmar Now. Airstrikes decreased notably in the area after the resistance began enforcing limits on internet use, he added. “After restricting Starlink, even when there are air raids, our experience is that they only actually hit old, previously occupied locations, or miss their targets instead of making direct hits,” Comrade Pablo said. He added that the resistance had aligned the internet usage rules with the security situation on the ground based on careful discussion and deliberation. “The Starlink regulations are rules formulated from a military perspective,” he said. Only shops providing internet services are restricted, Comrade Pablo said, while all household use is allowed. He also insisted that there was no curtailment of local people’s free expression or right to access information, and that in fact there were legal protections in place for people presenting their opinions and grievances to the resistance-connected administration. However, Comrade Pablo continued, there were real concerns that unrestricted internet use in a high-traffic township like Singu would make it easier for informants and spies to report to the junta. A woman was detained recently, for example, after sending information via the internet to the junta, which the military later appeared to have used to plan an airstrikes on the township’s Shwepyi village. Members of the Mandalay Region People’s Defence Forces (MDY-PDF) operating in Madaya Township, Mandalay Region (Photo: AFP) The NUG, as well as the three groups in the Brotherhood Alliance, controlled phone communications for security reasons in the territories they were holding during the year 2024, according to a report released by the Myanmar Internet Project. Operating a Starlink service shop still requires an initial registration fee of 500,000 kyat (US $123) and a tax of 10 percent on the shop’s monthly income, or 600,000 kyat (US $148). The NUG’s communications ministry also introduced additional vetting and approval procedures for opening a Starlink shop in May of 2024, citing security concerns. However, Major Swe Taw, a defector from the Myanmar military and participant in anti-junta movements since the coup, said it was unlikely that the military had the technology to hack or collect data remotely from Starlink equipment or services, or use it to track resistance forces’ whereabouts. “Information leaks occur more often from carelessly posting photos and sharing information on social media, allowing the army to deduce locations, rather than from military informants directly providing information,” Maj. Swe Taw said. “Airstrikes can happen because of information that leaks from people using their personal Starlink equipment and social media.” Because of this, he said, all Starlink equipment owners should be registered, and only people deemed trustworthy after a vetting and approval process should be allowed to use it, with clear rules in place for how to use the internet. An officer of the Shwebo Township People’s Defence Organisation (PDO) agreed that the military and its informants and spies conducted surveillance mainly by perusing content and photos shared on social networks. The civilian view Like any satellite dishes, Starlink communication dishes installed on rooftops and poles can be spotted or detected easily using aircraft and surveillance drones, a man assisting displaced people in the Sagaing Region said, so the assumption that the military chooses its targets based on concentrations of internet use in an area seems wrong. The resistance’s rationale for restricting internet use has been preventing informants from communicating with the military, he said, yet all resistance battalions use Starlink and it was wrong to restrict its use by civilians. “They’re indispensable,” he said of the Starlink apparatuses. “The idea that battalions can use them but the people can’t is nonsense. Battalions also need to communicate to get logistical support. Communications are needed to exchange news and information.” Anyone with a personal grievance against the resistance forces could turn informant, he said, and any informant would have a variety of means to communicate with junta authorities, not just the internet. “The main thing is that both PDO and PDF battalions need to be in harmony with the people,” he added. “Otherwise, the civilian population who suffer—It’s not that they’re inclined to inform. They just might think ‘If you treat me that way, I can get you back this way,’ and it leads to such situations.” Aung Pyae Sone, a resident of Magway Region, agreed security breaches and airstrikes are not directly attributable to internet use, as the military has always had intelligence networks in place and cultivated informants. Children using Starlink internet in an area controlled by resistance forces (Photo: AFP) “Informing doesn’t just happen through Starlink. There are various ways information can be relayed. Starlink is mainly for communications, while intelligence and information security are separate. These two parts need to be viewed distinctly without conflating them,” he said. Aung Pyae Sone added that simply restricting the internet cannot prevent leaks. The only effective way to prevent them, he said, is by conducting counterintelligence programmes against the junta’s informant networks. On October 14, the NUG’s communications minister Htin Linn Aung said on Radio NUG that the publicly mandated body is planning to implement a more flexible policy concerning internet use in territories under its control, adjusted to accommodate conditions on the ground. He gave assurances that they would only use persuasion, rather than arrests or confiscations. Thit Nyan, a digital rights researcher at Myanmar Internet Project, argued that the security-based internet restrictions have a real impact on people’s daily lives that has to be considered. “If there are security vulnerabilities, they should make announcements about best practices and inform the public before implementing security measures,” he said. “Human rights standards should be prioritised. In sum, the pros and cons of restricting internet usage for security purposes should be reassessed and the public interest should be prioritised.” Even as efforts are underway to self-restrict Starlink usages by communities and anti-junta governance mechanisms, concerns have arisen that the service may not be available at all in some places. Following revelations that the use of Starlink has enabled international online scam syndicates to mushroom in territories near the Thailand-Myanmar border, SpaceX may block its use in those areas, if not throughout Myanmar.

Myanmar resistance’s restriction of Starlink access draws backlash from civilians

Resistance fighters say uncontrolled access to Starlink is compromising security, but people in resistance-controlled areas who depend on Starlink for communication have questioned whether some restrictions are needed

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