What does the Arakan Army’s victory in Rakhine State mean for the Rohingya?

With exploding bombs and shells still audible in the distance, Mohamed* has had little choice but to bide his time since August in a village under the control of the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw Township, where he fled after clashes between the AA and Myanmar military forced him out of his home. The village, some six miles outside of Maungdaw’s urban centre, now hosts around 1,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in addition to its 1,500 longtime Rohingya residents. Many Rohingya from Maungdaw and nearby parts of northern Rakhine State have also fled to Bangladesh. Mohamed and the eight members of his family who fled with him are among these IDPs, whose efforts to survive and support themselves became a daily struggle as war spread through the state last year. The fighting began with the AA's resumption of offensive operations against the military in November 2023. “At the moment, we are facing huge difficulties with our livelihood,” Mohamed said, noting that the AA’s current ban on fishing in the nearby Naf River had come as a blow for the many people in the area who have few other reliable sources of food. Soon after taking over the military regime’s last remaining Border Guard Police (BGP) outpost in Maungdaw Township in December, the AA announced the “indefinite ban” on travelling or fishing the Naf River, citing reasons of safety and security. “There are many people who live hand to mouth just by fishing in the river. Now we can’t anymore,” Mohamed told Myanmar Now. “Without jobs, many people are struggling for food.” Acknowledging the meagre food and cash assistance the AA had distributed to Rohingya IDPs in the area, Mohamed said, “In recent days they gave us a cow for food, but it’s not enough for us.” Arakan Army fighters seen with junta soldiers taken as prisoners of war in Maungdaw in August 2024 (Photo: AA Info Desk) ‘Imminent famine’ and the chances of survival Myanmar’s military regime has systematically cut off means of transport into and communication with Rakhine State, including water, air, and bus routes as well as internet and phone connections, leaving residents to their own devices in accessing health services, education, and even food. According to the latest data released by the United Nations in November, at least two million people in Rakhine State are on the verge of “imminent famine.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, a local human rights advocate said that Rakhine State has suffered devastation twice: first from the effects of fighting that halted with a temporary ceasefire in late 2022, and again following the AA’s resumption of hostilities with the military just under a year later, which have continued without reprieve. The junta’s transport and communications blockades have prevented both domestic and international aid agencies from accessing the areas in greatest need even as conditions deteriorate for the impoverished population. “The resumption of war has doubled Rakhine State’s suffering,” the human rights worker said, noting that agriculture, fishing, and trade had all but come to a halt in the state, and that the people who remained were surviving only on savings or remittances from family living abroad. UN aid agencies have not been operating in Rakhine State since the 2021 coup, he added, let alone bringing necessary aid to IDPs living in areas under AA control. Moreover, the civil society organisations that were still active were only able to distribute aid once a month to the most vulnerable people, and had difficulty keeping track of the frequently moving IDPs. Even when they had the funds, the junta restrictions stopped the civil society groups from addressing the growing humanitarian crisis, according to the human rights worker. “Even if there is a famine, they cannot do anything. All they can do is try to help distribute to those they can reach,” he said. As with tens of thousands of others, Mohamed’s life as an IDP has been mired in myriad hardships, including not only food insecurity but a persistent lack of prospects for earning a living from work. “I have been looking for a job, but have not found one,” he said adding, “We are now worried how we will survive this.” In one of several conversations with Myanmar Now at the end of December, he was close to despair, saying that there were too many obstacles to even allow him to relocate in search of better opportunities. “I am sad. I have lost all aspiration to carry on with anything,” he said. ‘People are scared’ While Maungdaw and the neighbouring Buthidaung Township are reportedly under AA control, heavy artillery shelling has continued in the area, and the state of battle is unclear to IDPs and other local Rohingya people. “The situation on the ground is calmer now, after the AA’s takeover of the BGP-5 outpost,” Mohamed told Myanmar Now. According to local reports, as well as statements issued by the AA, the AA’s fighters have clashed with militias made up of Rohingya people co-opted as pawns or forcibly recruited by the military. The militias are reportedly abducting young men and forcing them to fight against the AA, while the AA has allegedly been pressing civilians into service in village security forces in territories under their control. “At night, we were forced to stand guard in the villages from 6pm to 6am. They told us to report to them if we see a different armed group,” Mohamed said. “It is not safe for us to be out there, but we do not have a choice. Otherwise they will arrest and beat us,” he added, referring to the AA. “If they ask, nobody will stay behind, because people are scared.” In efforts to establish its own administrative apparatus, the AA has assigned administrative duties to local Rohingya people in the villages, with AA patrols checking in with them occasionally. According to Mohamed, young Rohingya men like him not only have to fear abduction by Rohingya militias, but also the possibility that the AA will target them for arrest on suspicion of collaborating with the military. “For the moment, what we are worried about is the targeted arrest of young Rohingya men,” he told Myanmar Now. The AA has been accused of targeted violence against Rohingya civilians including arson attacks in villages, drone strikes, and sexual violence. Reports of violent incidents emerged in Buthidaung Township in May of 2024 and in Maungdaw Township in August. As the AA installs its administration, Rohingya civilians’ apprehension about life under AA-led governance is adding to their fears about poverty, food insecurity, and physical danger. “What we are most concerned about is misconduct by AA personnel on the ground,” Mohamed said. “It is not done directly, but indirectly.” “If they do that, who are we going to inform or report it to? That’s what we are most concerned about.” Not recognised as a legitimate ethnic minority or even as valid citizens of the country, the Rohingya are deprived of basic rights that Myanmar nationals are nominally guaranteed, such as freedom of movement, education up to a certain level, and health benefits. While Mohamed says the AA’s achievement in defeating the military and taking control of northern Rakhine State is worthy of praise, the question remains whether Rohingya people will now be able to live freely and with the same civil rights as others under the AA’s administration. “Our worry is whether we will be able to go to school, travel, or do business under their administration. We want to live in freedom without restrictions. We want equal rights without discrimination like other people here,” Mohamed said. “Our lives are in their hands. We have no hope if they oppress us.” Rohingya diaspora organisations issued a statement on December 23 appealing for justice, equal rights, peaceful coexistence, and inclusive governance in Rakhine State, including measures by the AA to hold violators of Rohingya people’s human rights to account. Rohingya people pray in a refugee camp in Bangladesh (Photo: Mohammed Zonaid) “You cannot build a country just by fighting” While the AA’s ranks are mostly made up of the Rakhine Buddhists, the state’s majority ethnic group, the powerful armed organisation has claimed to be fighting for all the people of Rakhine State, including the Chin, mostly Muslim Rohingya, and Kaman Muslim minorities. The AA even announced a rebrand in April of 2024, broadcasting that it was changing its older name “Arakan Army” to “Arakha Army” as a representation of this commitment. The human rights advocate working in Rakhine State said most domestic aid organisations have had to work in areas controlled by the AA after being threatened by junta authorities for rendering aid to the displaced. However, operating in AA territory carries its own limitations, for example a requirement to register their offices with AA officials. While they are allowed to distribute humanitarian assistance, they have not been permitted to survey aid recipients to better assess their needs. “They are more like a military than a government. That’s why they don’t like data collection. They’re wary of sensitive information leaking,” he said. He added that AA officials operating in these territories are not open to raising issues of gender equity or social cohesion, preferring to run the territory under their control in ways that minimise risks to security rather than tolerate potentially destabilising changes that civil society organisations might pursue. “You have to go through the higher level because people on the ground are more stringent,” he added. The human rights worker went on to argue that a key to understanding the present situation in Rakhine State is the observation that people with an education left for Yangon or went abroad as soon as they were able, leaving only people with limited means, minimal education, and ultranationalists. Most, however, hated the Myanmar military and were willing to support the AA’s cause. “Now they have won the war. Won the fight,” he said, “But the main question has become, what comes now?” Questions of language will present a challenge in education, he continued, noting that Chin and Rohingya people are likely to object if only the Rakhine language is taught in schools. Moreover, he added, the people on the ground are mainly trained for fighting, not for administration or human rights or democracy. With the AA and its political wing—the United League of Rakhine (ULA)—having won and installed their own administrators capable of running things from the top down in a military structure, ethnic minorities are now only able to get involved in decision-making at the bottom rung, he added. “I seek the inclusion and fulfilment of minority rights,” the advocate said. “In that respect, I’m concerned with the ULA and its military style of top-down rule.” While the ULA and AA’s policies may not be openly discriminatory, there is an increasingly apparent need for openness, acceptance of different perceptions from different backgrounds, and reassessment of the old, customary administrative policies and procedures, he argued. “They should have fair regulation and policy,” he added. “You cannot build a country just by fighting. They don’t know it just yet, but they will learn. I hope there’s a solution within reach.” ‘Arakan Dream’ Asked for his opinion on the present situation in the state, former lawmaker and retired politician Pe Than, an associate of the ULA and AA, said the “Arakan Dream” for Rakhine State “has never been closer.” A separate state and kingdom ruled Arakan—now known as Rakhine State—for centuries before its conquest by a neighbouring Burmese kingdom in 1784. Since then, it has never gained full autonomy and has existed as part of Myanmar (or Burma) throughout the period of British colonial rule, takeover by Imperial Japan, and Burmese independence. Many past Rakhine parties and armed groups have struggled to reach the same goal of liberating the state to pursue its own destiny, Pe Than said, but none had come close to the success of the ULA/AA. “The ULA emerged and made significant progress in less than a year, and that’s why the people of Arakan have entrusted the ULA with their support,” he said, referring to an older name for Rakhine State. Referring to the “Arakan Dream”, he said, “It has never been closer than before, because of trust and support from the people.” They believe that the Arakha Army is capable of “bringing back what has been lost,” he added, using the newly rebranded name of the AA. He did not specify whether this would entail the foundation of a new sovereign country, a confederation with the rest of Myanmar, greater legal autonomy within the state, or some other arrangement. When pressed on the issue of minority rights in Rakhine State, Pe Than pointed to the tension and conflicts between the Rakhine and other groups, especially Rakhine State’s Muslims. The emergence of Rohingya armed groups who assist the Myanmar military’s forced recruitment efforts and even fight alongside them has exacerbated this intercommunal conflict over the past year. Many of the Rohingya fighting alongside the military have been abducted and forced into service and the military initially drove the forced recruitment of Rohingya men as a deliberate way to provoke intercommunal tension in Rakhine State. “That has deepened already broken trust between them,” he said, referring to the armed groups aligned with the military. Pe Than insisted that the AA’s priority is to ensure equal rights and citizenship, but that it has to face the challenge of an international community that takes sides and propagates an exaggeratedly worrying image of intercommunal conflict in Rakhine State. “Therefore, the AA is more careful in handling minorities than the Rakhine themselves because the AA does not want conflict,” he said. Pe Than then added that minority groups coordinating with the ULA are on the right path, but it was “worrying” to see some allying with the military choosing to take up arms to fight against the AA. “If they choose the junta and fight against the AA, they have made the AA the enemy,” he said, but later added that in any case, when Rakhine State is fully liberated, Muslims will be liberated just like the Rakhine. “We have to be united for the Arakan Dream under the ULA/AA’s leadership for better outcome and better relationship,” he said. “I think Muslim leaders should think about cooperation, rather than attacking Rakhine people. That’s the only way forward.” In this photo taken in July 2021, members of the internally displaced Rohingya community gather by their makeshift shelters at the Baw Du Pha IDP Camp in Sittwe Township, Rakhine State (Photo: AFP/STR) The way forward, and the need to tread carefully With the AA’s military success truly unprecedented in the country’s history, Rakhine State has entered uncharted political territory, according to David Mathieson, a longtime analyst of Myanmar politics. Since resuming offensive operations in late November 2023, the AA has achieved overwhelming results, purging the Myanmar military’s forces not only from township-level administrative centres but most of the army’s tactical bases throughout the state. The group has also taken full control of Myanmar’s 271-kilometre border with Bangladesh and the military’s Western Regional Military Command headquarters in Ann Township. It now controls most of the state except the state capital of Sittwe, the deep-sea port town of Kyaukphyu, and the island township of Manaung. While the Rakhine Buddhist majority celebrates these triumphs, the question looming for the stateless Rohingya minority is how the AA will govern. Close to a million Rohingya have been residing in refugee camps in the Bangladeshi district of Cox’s Bazar since 2017, with 60,000 more fleeing to the camps as violence flared up in Maungdaw Township in August. In discussing the issue of repatriating more than a million Rohingya to Rakhine State, Mathieson recognised the importance of the goal but stressed that it was fraught with complications, and argued that priority must be given to humanitarian assistance, rights, freedom of movement, and protection for Rohingya people remaining in Rakhine State. The greatest challenges that would beset repatriation efforts arise from the growing strength of Rohingya armed groups hostile to the AA and collaborating with the Myanmar military. These Rohingya armed groups—especially the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA)—have become notorious in Rakhine State and Bangladesh for waging violent turf wars in refugee camps, subjecting refugees to harassment and extortion, and abducting young men to force them into combat on the side of the Myanmar military. “There is a narrative that the AA are the greatest threat to the Rohingya, which obscures the reality that RSO, ARSA, and ARA are siding with the Myanmar military,” Mathieson said. Credible evidence indicates that AA members have committed and continue to perpetrate human rights abuses against Rohingya and other civilians. Even considering this, Mathieson argued that there is no greater contributor to the danger faced by Rohingya people than the Rohingya armed groups, which have made the broader Rohingya community the target of reprisals and put them in the crossfire of the AA’s fight with the military for control of Rakhine State. “It is important to factor in that Rohingya armed groups aligned with the Sit Tat pose as much of a threat, if not more, to the Rohingya as the AA,” he said, using the common phrase “Sit Tat” for the Myanmar military. While the Bangladeshi government in Dhaka has emphasised the goal of repatriating refugees from the camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladeshi security forces facilitated the arming and operations of the Myanmar military-aligned Rohingya groups, and therefore bear part of the blame for their emergence and the threat they represent to the Rohingya in Rakhine State. “If these militant groups continue to attack the AA and seek sanctuary in Bangladesh, it could well jeopardise any repatriation in safety and dignity for years to come,” he added. “It will also endanger the opening of trade and humanitarian aid links between Bangladesh and the AA administration.” Bangladesh is also navigating an unprecedented political situation after a student-led popular movement brought an end to the second, 15-year premiership of Sheikh Hasina in August of last year. A new interim government, led by Nobel laureate Prof. Muhammad Yunus, has publicly expressed support for the Rohingya refugee population, and for the goal of repatriating them to Rakhine State. During a summit with neighbouring countries in Bangkok in December, the foreign affairs adviser for the Bangladeshi interim government Md. Touhid Hossain called for a comprehensive roadmap for Rohingya repatriation as well as for key actors such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to play a proactive role in restoring peace, security, and democracy in Myanmar. However, in an additional complication for repatriation, Hossain has also said that Bangladesh cannot directly engage with non-state actors, despite acknowledging the AA’s influence. In Mathieson’s view, Bangladesh is in a position to show leadership by advocating the inclusion of Myanmar’s ethnic armed organisations or their political wings in diplomatic discussions. This is especially true in cases where the Myanmar military has fully lost control of territory, leaving de facto authority in the hands of groups like the AA/ULA or the Chin Brothers—an alliance active in parts of Chin State. “The world needs to acknowledge the reality that the illegitimate Myanmar military state has lost control of its sovereignty,” he said. For its own part, the AA has been vocal about its intentions to reach trade agreements with India and Bangladesh, and has called on the international community to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Rakhine State after the devastation of war. A statement released by the AA on December 29 promised the group would work towards achieving freedom for “all ethnic groups within the Arakan region.” “The AA has been mostly fairly supportive of inclusion and an end to discrimination, but the reality will be tested on the ground, not in AA statements,” Mathieson said in response. The years of mistrust between Rohingya and Rakhine communities are cause for uncertainty about the future of Rakhine State under AA control, Mathieson argued, but the AA may still grudgingly recognise Rohingya people’s rights for the sake of stability and coexistence. The international community may be inclined to focus on the kind of support the AA needs to rebuild a stable Rakhine State, Mathieson argued, in which case turning on the Rohingya would likely endanger that support, force the AA to accept stronger influence from China, and further complicate the group’s relationship with Bangladesh. “The West should also be more proactively engaging with Bangladesh to establish much needed humanitarian supply routes into Rakhine to assist all communities,” he said. “The aftermath of a bitter armed conflict will definitely make any positive reconnection challenging,” he added. However, “the various communities all need each other for reconstruction and economic recovery, and that cooperation is necessary now.” * The name of this source has been changed to protect his security.

What does the Arakan Army’s victory in Rakhine State mean for the Rohingya?

While recent successes by the Arakan Army (AA) may signal an imminent end to war with the military in Rakhine State, the Rohingya community faces a future at the mercy of the AA, Rohingya militant groups, and the Bangladeshi government

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