Is the war in Myanmar approaching its ‘culminating point’?

More than four and a half years into Myanmar’s multi-sided civil war, it is still far from clear whether it will end in the defeat of the country’s oppressive military regime. The initial euphoria of Operation 1027, which began in October 2023 and entered its second and even more dramatic phase the following year, has worn off. Far from being the “tipping point” of the conflict, the developments of the past two years, including the junta’s loss of significant amounts of territory in northern Shan State and its almost complete rout in Rakhine State, must be compared with the setbacks that anti-regime forces have faced in the central Anya region and southern Shan State and Karenni State. One potential line of inquiry to understand the course of the conflict comes from the German theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who in his 1832 classic “On War” (“Vom Krieg”) writes of the “culminating point” in war. In essence, this involves a clear assessment of the opponent’s increase in strength relative to its decrease in strength: “The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely. … In the progress of action in war, the combatant force is incessantly meeting with elements which strengthen it, and others which weaken it. Hence it is a question of superiority on one side or the other. As every diminution of power on one side is to be regarded as an increase on the opposite, it follows, of course, that this double current, this ebb and flow, takes place whether troops are advancing or retiring.” Several variables are important. These include loss of personnel, loss of war material, territorial setbacks, overstretched military operations, allies defecting to the opposing side, and the enemy gaining strength. Another way to look at the culminating point is the ratio of territorial losses to gains, the tempo of advance and retreat. But in its simpler form, it is an inquiry into whether the military opponent can no longer achieve its objectives. Military historians are obsessed with retrospective appraisals of when conflicts reached a culminating point, and why states continue to fight wars they cannot win. Many historians of World War Two have argued that Nazi Germany simply couldn’t win the war after 1943, due to setbacks on several battlefields and the growing industrial and military strength of the Western allies and Russia. When should the United States have assessed it could not militarily, let alone politically, win the Vietnam War? Some historians suggest it was clear by 1965. But massive escalation followed. And why did the Western coalition in Afghanistan stay engaged there for 20 years, when the war against the Taliban appeared doomed in 2009? Of course, caution is needed when applying passages from the work of an 18th-century European theorist like Clausewitz to a 21st-century civil war in Myanmar. But there are generalised lessons in the study of war that can be applied to Myanmar’s past and present patterns of hostilities. The junta’s retaking of the town of Nawnghkio in northern Shan State in mid-July is one instructive recent case pointing to the difficulty of assessing the course of the country’s civil war. Junta troops pose for a photo after retaking the town of Nawnghkio in northern Shan State in early July (Photo: Telegram) The fall of Nawnghkio Two main factors, amongst a complex host of variables, account for the regime’s retaking of Nawnghkio: infantry reinforcements and air power, including drones. There have certainly been changes to Myanmar military operational modalities over the past four years, largely attributable to its need to adapt under fire. The military has undoubtedly made mistakes and suffered many setbacks, but it also seems to be learning from these failures and making significant adjustments. One clear indication of this is in the use of air power. Previously, airstrikes were only authorised from the very top of the military command, usually at the War Office in Naypyitaw. But as the Myanmar Defence and Security Institute reported in April, the military has significantly changed the way it deploys its air power. It is now clear that calling in tactical airstrikes to support troops in contact comes from Regional Command (or possibly Military Operations Command) level, which accelerates response time. This Close Air Support (CAS) capability is distinct from more strategic bombing targeting directed by higher command. The weapons systems used are also different, which suggests a significant rationalisation of air power assets. Claims that the use of Y-12 transport planes as light bombers or para-gliders to bomb civilian targets are a sign of “desperation” totally misses the point: the military is improvising and adapting to prevailing conditions on a fast evolving battlespace. The increased use of drones has been a major factor in this evolution across Myanmar, but especially in the Nawnghkio battles. The military has evidently augmented its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to enable it to more effectively identify targets. This development, reportedly supported by technological assistance from both China and Russia, has done much to strengthen the position of troops on the ground. It’s also worth inquiring about what software upgrades junta drones have received. At this time of year in Shan State, in the middle of the monsoon, heavy cloud cover, storms, and visibility issues would normally limit use of drones. But it appears that the military has found ways to surmount some of these environmental constraints. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which captured Nawnghkio in June of last year, also faced a serious challenge in neutralising the junta’s fire support bases in the hills around the town. Despite months of offensive operations and the overrunning of a number of artillery bases, the TNLA was unable to take out many of these massive installations, most of which are located on fortified hilltops. Attacking them with lightly armed infantry forces is a major undertaking, even with the deployment of drones. Many of these bases have a variety of weapons systems, such as 105mm field howitzers with a range of 10 to 20km, 155mm guns (20-40km range) and 120mm mortars (7-10km range). Another major issue for anti-junta groups is their inability to find technical fixes to counter the regime’s air power. Air power does not win wars, but it can be used to harry the enemy and prep for ground operations, and to support troop movements with CAS in ongoing manoeuvres. The biggest mistake the resistance will face is if they stubbornly hold onto towns when it makes more tactical and strategic sense to temporarily withdraw or reposition. Technology and weapons systems are certainly playing a crucial role here. But in this type of conflict, what claws back territory is infantry troops on the ground retaking positions and driving back the resistance forces. Increased use of drones for surveillance and offence are important, as is air power and artillery, but it is ground forces that are decisive. In short, does it make sense for the military to maintain offensive operations to take back Nawnghkio in Shan State, or parts of Karen State, or to push hard into Hpakant, when it could consolidate the heartland and keep open logistics and resupply lines, fortify the main cities and the defence industry facilities zone, and continue using its air power and artillery to harass its many enemies, all while fomenting political fragmentation amongst them? Recent conscripts into Myanmar’s military prepare to begin their training (Photo: Telegram) The false positives of conflict data Another lesson, not just for Nawnghkio, but also for other ongoing battles, is the need for the replenishment of frontline soldiers. By some estimates, 50-70,000 troops have been recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed in 13 intakes since the junta’s Military Service Law went into effect in February 2024. Initial assessments that the conscription drive would cripple the military were simply wrong. The opposite appears to have transpired—that is, it has given the army the ability to reinforce frontline formations and slowly prepare for counteroffensives. The contention that poorly motivated conscripts will not fight, and that this will adversely impact combat operations, does not seem to have been the case, at least not universally. Doubtless there have been desertions and brutal treatment; but if even a third of conscripts end up joining the fight, even without experience or combat finesse, that could be enough to prevail in certain battles, such as the one for Nawnghkio. As Clausewitz wrote elsewhere in “On War,” “the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.” That is as objectively evident in Myanmar as in other conflicts. Data can be a misleading feature in the study of war in Myanmar. Three years ago there was widespread triumphant analysis that heavy battlefield losses would end in the implosion of the military. Certainly the casualty rates were staggering, and scenes of troops surrendering en masse were powerful. But the junta army’s full collapse has yet to happen. Other data streams, such the intensity of concurrent battles, number of airstrikes, reinforcement numbers in main battles, or the quantity of seized weapons and ammunition stockpiles, can be equally misleading. Intangible elements of morale, motivation, loyalty, and command are also poorly understood or have been miscast in the fog of propaganda. The main metric for measuring resistance success in the past two years has been the mapping of captured towns, by the Myanmar Peace Monitor amongst others. By this measure, the junta’s recent recapture of towns like Nawnghkio, Thabeikkyin in Mandalay Region, and Moebye in southern Shan State are all major setbacks. Yet anti-regime forces still operate in many villages around these towns, and so the “fall of towns” may not be as consequential as many might think. The next major battle to pay close attention to is the fight for Bhamo, which the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has yet to capture despite several months of intense effort. Several factors seem salient. The first is that the junta continued to resupply the garrison there, first by airdrop and then by direct supply flights using Y-8s and Mi-17s. Bhamo has been threatened for over two years, and the KIA assault starting in late 2024 seemed to herald a rapid collapse, which then degenerated into siege warfare and high attrition rates on both sides, as well as civilian casualties and widespread damage to the town. Another factor is the resupply flotilla that began travelling up the Ayeyarwady River from Mandalay last month. Despite coming under attack at numerous points along the river, it kept steaming north to Bhamo, taking three weeks for what should have been a three-day journey. According to some reports, 11 out of 18 vessels made it all the way to the town, while the rest were either destroyed by resistance forces or forced to return to Mandalay. A third factor is China, which is reportedly pressuring the KIA to call off its offensive after earlier urging the group to either take Bhamo quickly or not at all. It is impossible to determine where these disparate battles are headed, other than to observe that both sides seem determined to hold, or reclaim, territory at whatever cost. It is also necessary to step back from individual battles and look at the broader conflict space, from the theatre level (across states or regions) to the national level. Simply calculating the culminating point in any conflict on the data of captured towns is only the first step in understanding conflict dynamics. Karen National Liberation Army and allied troops pose after seizing a junta camp in Karen State’s Myawaddy Township in March 2024 (Photo: METRO) The rise of Kawthoolei Myanmar’s many theatres of war are decidedly different, in terms of geography, fighting forces, and—crucially—geostrategic realities. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has achieved dramatic battlefield gains in overrunning several bases along the Thai-Myanmar border, coming close to banishing regime forces from the borderline. But it has to be observed that this has been a long attritional conflict that arguably began with the capture of the Thee Mu Hta base in March 2021. This underscores just how complicated overrunning dozens of bases and interdicting the army’s ability to resupply and reinforce those bases can be. This is especially true in the context of the interlocking militarisation of the border region and the delicate relationship with Thailand. Meanwhile, the KNLA and its allies have also made advances into eastern Bago Region, making remarkable but still fragile territorial gains in central Myanmar, far from the border. At the same time, the military has renewed its efforts to re-establish full control over the Hpa-an to Myawaddy trade route. On the night of August 10, it carried out airstrikes on the Karen National Union headquarters in KNLA Brigade 7 territory. As in the north, the ebb and flow of the conflict in the eastern borderlands is still highly dynamic. However, one important element has been consistent, and that is the KNLA’s ability to train and deploy People’s Defence Force (PDF) units in its ongoing battles, an important source of expanded ground troop strength. However, ammunition and supply sourcing remain a constant headache for the revolutionary forces. The Rakhine State campaign The situation in Rakhine State is considerably different to that in Karen and Shan states, in that the unprecedented territorial gains made there by the Arakan Army (AA) since late 2023 seem, at least for the foreseeable future, irreversible. It is highly unlikely that the Myanmar military will have the capacity to regain control over the Bangladesh border anytime soon. For now, it appears that the military doesn’t have sufficient ground troops for the Rakhine theatre. However, rumours are swirling that it may try to retake Thandwe, after bombing the area in early August. The seaborne reinforcement of Kyaukphyu and Sittwe is another element to consider. Rakhine media has also reported on rumours that the military may try to recapture Ponnagyun in the near future. The AA may have achieved stunning land victories, but the junta’s navy is still a formidable asset. But there are three factors to consider. First, what is the strategy of the AA and its allies for areas adjacent to Rakhine State, including Magway Region, with its concentration of defence industry factories, and the Ayeyarwady Delta? Are their operations there a probe in force or a full-blown invasion? And why do these operations appear to have slowed down? Is it due to the onset of the monsoon, or is it for logistical reasons? Second, what are the AA’s designs on Kyaukphyu? Will they try to take the entire island and risk heavy bombardment? Fighting has been ongoing there for several months, with the AA squeezing the perimeter of the town while making sure to avoid damaging Chinese economic interests. Meanwhile, the military sent 400-500 reinforcement troops to the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base in early July, possibly heralding another major battle. And third, what are the AA’s plans for Sittwe? It’s one thing to have a military strategy to take the state capital, but another to work out how to manage the needs of its civilian population. Of course, this is true not just in Sittwe, but also throughout the AA’s conquered territories. A more systematic military analysis—one with a more penetrating look into specific battles, seen within a broader historical context—is needed, as the conflict in Myanmar looks set to continue for a longer and more destructive duration than many have anticipated. There is no evident culminating point yet. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarianism, and human rights in Myanmar

Is the war in Myanmar approaching its ‘culminating point’?

Nearly five years into a conflict being fought on multiple fronts, it is still far from clear who will prevail in the end

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