Between resistance and the ballot box: Assessing the second phase of Myanmar’s junta-controlled elections

Myanmar’s military junta is pressing ahead today with the second phase of its planned general election, even as armed conflict, political repression, and widespread public disengagement continue to undermine the credibility of the process. The first phase of the junta-organised election concluded on December 28, 2025. It was marked by extremely low voter turnout, heavy reliance on advance ballots, and repeated allegations of intimidation and procedural abuse—raising serious doubts about whether subsequent phases can meet even the most basic democratic standards. The 2025 election process also began with an unusually explicit show of international backing. On December 30, China’s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, Deng Xijun, publicly stated that the election was being conducted with the consent of Chinese President Xi Jinping—the first time since the 2021 coup that a senior Chinese official has openly acknowledged Beijing’s “cooperative efforts” in formulating the junta’s political roadmap. Inside Myanmar, the statement deepened public scepticism, reinforcing perceptions that China’s long-standing claims of non-interference are contradicted by its practical support for the junta’s bid for political legitimacy. What the first phase revealed Six major parties contested the first phase nationwide, but as widely anticipated, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) dominated the results. According to post-election tallies, the USDP secured 90 of 102 contested seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and 21 of 31 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). Genuine political competition was absent. Major opposition parties—including the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi—have been abolished by the junta. Suu Kyi has remained imprisoned since the 2021 military coup, effectively removing the country’s most popular political force from the electoral landscape. Advance voting once again emerged as a central source of controversy. The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), however, has offered no meaningful remedies. Instead, UEC chair Than Soe—a former military officer—warned political parties on January 5 that “defaming rival parties” during campaigning could constitute a criminal offence, a statement widely interpreted as an attempt to suppress criticism rather than address electoral irregularities. That warning was swiftly reinforced by action. On January 8, People’s Party candidate Lwin Myint was sentenced to one year in prison with hard labour for using the word “revolution” in campaign materials in reference to nationwide protests against the military coup in 2021. A polling station in downtown Yangon opens for voting on January 11 (Photo: Kan Kaung / Myanmar Now) Second phase: elections amid active conflict The second phase of the election is taking place across roughly 100 townships, many of them located in areas experiencing active or recent armed conflict. In Kachin State, voting is scheduled in Waingmaw, Mohnyin and Machanbaw townships—all of which have seen clashes between junta forces and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied resistance groups. The UEC has already acknowledged that full polling will not be possible in these areas. In Karenni State, elections are being held in Demoso and Hpruso townships, both of which were only recently retaken by junta forces after prolonged resistance control and where renewed fighting remains likely. Karen State presents a similar picture. Voting is scheduled in Hlaingbwe and Hpapun townships, the latter of which lies within territory dominated by Brigade 5 of the Karen National Union, one of the most militarily powerful resistance formations in the country. In Chin and Rakhine states, the junta’s reach is even more limited. Most townships remain under the control of resistance forces, including Chin armed groups and the Arakan Army (AA). As a result, large parts of both states are effectively excluded from all remaining phases of the election. The junta has attempted to compensate for this absence by using proportional representation mechanisms to appoint state-level lawmakers in areas where no polling has taken place—a manoeuvre critics describe as a legal sleight of hand designed to fabricate the appearance of inclusive governance. Elsewhere, the pattern repeats. In Mon State, where conflict has been comparatively limited, second-phase voting is being held in five townships, though Ye Township remains highly unstable due to frequent clashes with resistance forces. In Shan State, the military has acknowledged that elections cannot be held at all in 17 townships controlled by ethnic armed organisations. Even in areas where voting is planned, many will see only partial polling. In Sagaing and Magway regions—strongholds of the anti-junta resistance—the UEC has conceded that full elections can be held in only a small minority of townships. Recent fighting, including the recapture of towns shortly after first-phase voting, underscores the volatility of these areas. Yangon Region is the notable exception. The junta claims that all 45 townships in the country’s largest city will be able to vote, with 16 townships scheduled for the second phase. Even here, however, voter apathy, coercion of civil servants, and the absence of credible opposition continue to cast doubt on the authenticity of the process. Chin and Rakhine: elections grind to a halt In Chin and Rakhine states, the junta’s election process has effectively ground to a halt after the first phase of voting. Polling in both states took place only on December 28 and was confined to a handful of military-held urban centres. The military-appointed UEC has confirmed that nationwide phases two and three—scheduled for January 11 and January 25—will proceed without Chin and Rakhine, reflecting the regime’s loss of territorial control. In Rakhine State, first-phase voting was limited to Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung townships. Of the state’s 17 townships, 14 are controlled by the AA, which barred elections in areas under its authority. On December 27, the UEC formally excluded several Rakhine townships—including Ann, Gwa, Thandwe and Toungup—from national and state assembly races. As a result, polling was confined to the three townships still partly under military control, and even there it was uneven. Full voting took place only in Manaung. In Sittwe, polls were cancelled in one urban ward and 17 village tracts, while in Kyaukphyu voting was scrapped in five urban wards and 48 village tracts. Taken together, the first phase of Myanmar’s 2025 election revealed a process defined by low participation, opaque advance voting, intimidation of candidates and the systematic sidelining of opposition parties. The second phase, unfolding amid ongoing conflict and territorial fragmentation, appears even less capable of delivering a meaningful political outcome. Without fairness, transparency and genuine competition, the junta’s election risks becoming not a pathway to stability, but another instrument for entrenching military rule—detached from the will of the public and the realities on the ground.

Between resistance and the ballot box: Assessing the second phase of Myanmar’s junta-controlled elections

Unfolding amid ongoing conflict and territorial fragmentation, the second phase will deliver an outcome even less meaningful than the first

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